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The Cost of Inexperience
ABSTRACT
Free market entry is vital in preventing concentration of market power
and eliminating large deadweight losses. Yet, in recent years, studies show
that newcomers are less successful than existing firms that have diversified
their products in the market. What might explain this phenomenon?
This Article unveils a regulatory catch-22. Although a given regulation
may be efficient in correcting one market failure, its distributional effects
may create another. "Economies of experience" in regulation create
significant disadvantages to newcomers and provide substantial
advantages to old-timers. Being well-versed in their marketplace, old-
timers possess knowledge, familiarity, and influence over the rulemaking
process. New or "green" entities entering regulated markets or dealing
with a new rule face proportionally larger costs to obtain regulatory
insight. Consequently, an anomaly exists when government actions may de
facto hamper innovation and survival of newcomers, the same goals it
seeks to promote.
To remedy this inconsistency, the Article suggests ways to offset these
distributional asymmetries through the use of information cooperatives,
regulatory sandboxes, and compensatory mechanisms. These solutions
offer policymakers greater egulatory efficiency without deregulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Newcomers are more likely to fail. Yet, in the last two decades, studies
have demonstrated that while the rate of newcomers entering the market is
higher than ever,' these startups are less successful than existing firms
compared to those that have diversified their products in the market.
2 One
reason for this anomaly may be the distributional impact of government
1. See generally Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Presentation
at the Kaufmann Foundation Conference on Federal Tax Policy and Entrepreneurship (Sept. 27, 2013)
(examining innovation in the U.S.).
2. See, e.g., Leigh Buchanan, American Entrepreneurship Is Actually Vanishing. Here's Why,
INC. MAGAZINE (May 2015), https://www.inc.com/magazine/
201505/leigh-buchanan/the-vanishing-
startups-in-decline.html (citing Census data and concluding that more new businesses are dying than are
being born); Ian Hathaway & Robert E. Litan, Declining Business Dynamism in the United States: A
Look at States and Metros, BROOKINGS (May 5, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/declining-
business-dynamism-in-the-united-states-a-look-at-states-and-metros/ (documenting a pervasive increase
in business consolidation during the last few decades); Ruth Simon & Joe Shoulak, Level of New U.S.
Startups Has Stalled, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/level-of-new-u-s-
startups-has-stalled-1444869569 (reporting long-term decline in entrepreneurship activity); see also
Timothy Dunne et al., Patterns of Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 19 RAND J. ECON.
495, 513, tbl.1 1 (1988) (an empirical study on entry and exit rates for both startups and diversifying
entrants); P.A. Geroski, What Do We Know About Entry?, 13 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 421, 424 (1995)
("De novo entry is more common but less successful than entry by diversification.").
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regulation on private enterprise.3  Modem business practice requires
adhering to numerous regulations, obtaining licenses or approvals from
various governmental authorities, and making informational filings to
either enter or stay in the market.4
Consider Entities A and B, both currently in the development stage of
drones for commercial delivery use. Entity A is a newcomer while Entity B
has been producing drones for various industrial surveillance uses. Entity A
developed drones that are made from lighter material, can operate longer,
and include enhanced security features. However, it will face many
preliminary costs. It needs to resolve technological issues such as ensuring
reliable service, safe use, and aerial communication.5 Like any other
business, it will have to find investors, study the market structure, create a
customer base, and establish a chain of suppliers. To survive in the market,
it will need to do so while selling its products at a competitive price. These
costs are part of the price of doing business.
Nevertheless, unlike Entity B, Entity A also will need to acquire
knowledge about the air and public safety regulations that govern the
airborne artefacts market such as the Federal Aviation Administration
regulation and various state legislation.6 It might also need to research the
regulatory environments of its potential collaborators such as Walmart,
Amazon, Google, and Alibaba to avoid putting them in compliance default
by using its drones.7 Yet, current airborne artefacts regulation is outdated
and does not address widespread commercial delivery use. Entity A may be
3. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (2d ed. 2000) (demonstrating the interconnection
between market entry and antitrust law); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing
Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J.
1559, 1559-61 (1990) (debating whether corporate self-regulation is preferable to government
regulation).
4. Dunne et al., supra note 2, at 515.
5. See, e.g., Roger Clarke, Understanding the Drone Epidemic, 30 COMP. L. & SECURITY REV.
230, 234 (2014) (documenting the nature, purpose, and characteristics of drones).
6. See, e.g., Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689,
6689-90 (Feb. 13, 2007); Rich Williams, 2014 State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Legislation,
NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/2014-state-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-legislation.aspx; see also Roger Clarke & Lyria
Bennett Moses, The Regulation of Civilian Drones' Impacts on Public Safety, 30 COMP. L. & SECURITY
REv. 263, 267-68 (2014) (identifying a range of regulatory gaps and uncertainties in the drone
industry).
7. See, e.g., Teresa Hayes, The Rising Demand for Drones in the Retail Sector,
MARKETRESEARCH.COM (Jun. 29, 2016), https://blog.marketresearch.com/the-demand-for-drones-in-
the-retail-sector (surveying the growing interest in delivery drones). See also the effect on Mazda's
reputation as a result of a third-party airbag manufacturer's malfunction. WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2015,
at G02 ("Ford (joining Honda, Toyota and Nissan) will no longer be using air-bag inflaters [sic] made
by Takata, another blow to the troubled Japanese parts supplier. Takata inflaters [sic] can explode with
too much force, sending shrapnel into drivers and passengers.").
862 [Vol. 69:4:859
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compelled to pursue regulatory change before it is able to widely retail its
innovative drones.8
These regulatory costs are not trivial. They serve as high entry
barriers.9 As a current industrial drone manufacturer, Entity B already
possesses this knowledge and market influence. It has experience with air
safety and product liability regulation. It has a greater ability to mitigate
future regulatory changes. It may even utilize its knowledge to block Entity
A's entry or persuade the regulator to hamper Entity A's ability to compete
in the drone market.'0 If Entity A is still under development of its
innovative drone, such regulatory pressure may restrain its progress and
even halt production altogether. It may deter a universe of new
technologies from coming into existence. Scholars have noted that
"identifying . .. innovation restraints has proven to be very difficult.""
"Develop[ing] ... suitable remedies [has been] even more problematic."'2
This Article's original contribution is twofold. First, it introduces a new
way to think about how regulations might affect business decisions. It
argues that regulations have the potential of affecting newcomers more
perversely than old-timers.13 Second, the Article moves beyond the
mythology of startup firms and considers firms with experience levels of all
types. It denotes regulatory experience as a much broader concept.14
Economies of experience is coined in this Article as the benefit of age, but
also scope.15 Whereas old-timers may be able to spread regulatory costs
over their output or longevity, newcomers are more likely limited in their
ability to mitigate these costs due to structural obstacles.16 This observation
8. Consider, for example, the case of a PVC tube manufacturer who did not receive approval
from the electrical Code due to the lobbying efforts of old-timers who produced steel conductors. Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) (involving
an old-timer family corporation using its influence to convince the City of Columbia to block a new
Georgia firm from erecting signs on its territory).
11. Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 247, 253 (2007).
12. Id.
13. By "regulation," this Article refers to the vast range of formal rules (judicial, legislative, and
administrative) that are "regulatory" in the sense that they burden behavior in order to change social
welfare payoffs. See generally WILLIAM EDWARD LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT
AND HiS LEGACY 165-70 (1995) (describing the proliferation of government regulation during
President Roosevelt's years).
14. A mature firm could still be inexperienced scope-wise and the managers of a startup could
have an abundance of experience. Non-startup firms entering certain new markets (such as airline and
pharmaceutical industries) might be as important for the economy.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
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reveals regressive regulatory barriers.17 Many newcomers might not be
aware of the extent of these pitfalls until faced with administrative delays
and overwhelming costs. Others may forgo entering the market altogether.
The effects of regulatory asymmetries on newcomers are palpable.
Economic development correlates significantly with the existence of
innovative young firms.18 Free market entry is the foundation of a vibrant
economy.19 It helps prevent the concentration of market power, reduces
supracompetitive profits,2 0 and eliminates large deadweight losses.2 1 It
increases productive efficiency by forcing market players to innovate and
17. For a clarification of the use of the term "regressive" in this Article see infra note 27. See
MICHAELA SAISANA & STEFANO TARANTOLA, STATE-OF-THE-ART REPORT ON CURRENT
METHODOLOGIES AND PRACTICES FOR COMPOSITE INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT 5 (2002) (defining a
"composite indicator" as a mathematical combination of indicators and proposing it to be a better way
to represent different dimensions of a concept as the subject of examination).
18. See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 81 (1973); see also John
Haltiwanger, Entrepreneurship and Job Growth, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC
POLICY, 319, 319 (Zoltan J. Acs et al. eds., 2009); John Haltiwanger et al., Who Creates Jobs? Small
Versus Large Versus Young, 95 REv. ECON. & STAT. 347, 360 (2013); Global Entrepreneurship Week,
FED. NEWS FEED (Dec. 15, 2015). See generally ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE
MARKET: ESSAYS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2002) (continuing the Mises-Hayek legacy that
examines the market economy and theories of Competition and Entrepreneurship); Joseph A.
Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (1911), reprinted in THE ENTREPRENEUR, in THE
ENTREPRENEUR, CLASSIC TEXTS BY JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER 153-56 (Markus C. Becker et al. eds.,
2011).
19. See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND
CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 142 (1956) (defining barriers to entry as factors that
allow corporations to obtain higher than normal profits while deterring others from entering and
competing); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-70 (1968) (distinguishing
between capital requirements and barriers to entry by holding that existing firms also have to meet these
requirements while acknowledging that they serve as a determinant of economies of scale and the shape
of the long-run average cost curve); see also Richard Schmalensee, Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to
Entry, 94 AM. EcoN. REV. 471, 471-77 (2004) (noting that economists disagree about what market
characteristics constitute "true" barriers to entry). But see Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits
Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 161 (1997) (noting that higher entry barriers can be beneficial in
encouraging entry by emphasizing the benefits of successful entry).
20. See, e.g., TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN
THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY 24-26 (1999) (advocating government policies should generate outcomes
closer to what would be produced by free entry with price discrimination); Christopher S. Yoo,
Rethinking the Commitment o Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1592 (2003) (noting that
free entry by new competitors dissipates supracompetitive profits that may exist in the short run).
21. See generally Douglas Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility
Industry: An Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 82 (1993) (noting that the existence of competitors
ensures many benefits of competitive markets). For a discussion of the centrality of the value of free
enterprise in American history, see Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why is Small Business the Chief Business of
Congress?, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 13 (2012) (arguing that mistrust of big corporations and a belief in free
enterprise are central social values in U.S. history); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 250 (2004). But see Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Can
Free Entry Be Inefficient? Fixed Commissions and Social Waste in the Real Estate Industry, 111 J. POL.
ECON. 1076, 1076 (2003) (describing situations where free entry policy may not be in the public
interest).
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to lower costs, thereby creating benefits for consumers.22 Freedom of entry
also facilitates greater competition.2 3 Although legislators purport to
embolden free entry, ironically, newcomers are the ones most
disadvantaged by regulation. By its own action, the government places
heftier burdens on those seeking to enter the market and compete, thus
indirectly obstructing innovation.24 While trying to correct certain
imperfect outcomes, the government may create others.
This Article reveals the effects of government regulation on
newcomers. The concepts of "newcomers" and "old-timers" play a central
role in this Article. It will be helpful, therefore, to clarify the meaning of
these terms at the outset. Although the term has several meanings, this
Article uses newcomers to describe young and inexperienced firms in
various industries. Old-timers are the opposite of newcomers and possess
an abundance of market experience, connections, and industrial and
regulatory knowledge.25 Although the terms may refer to both individuals
and entities, this Article focuses on the latter. Lastly, the Article applies to
newcomers in various regulatory environments with no specific industry in
mind. It includes, but is not limited to, newcomers entering mature
industries with significant regulation (such as pharmaceutical,
communication, or utilities) or those acting through technological
innovations in services, manufacturing, or retail industries. It also narrates
"regulation" in a broader sense to include general "meta regulations" (such
as securities laws and labor and employment laws) as well as industry-
specific regulations (taxi, hotel, or airborne artefact regulations).
Following this introduction, Part II begins by discussing regulatory
costs.2 6 They could be especially detrimental to newcomers that are not
aware of their existence until later in the process. They can be direct or
indirect. They may be borne by the regulator, the regulated, or unregulated
parties. Part III presents the concept of economies (and diseconomies) of
22. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of
the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1342-43 (1986) (discussing entry and
competitive conditions in the cable television industry). But see Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 21, at 1076
(describing situations where free entry policy may not be in the public interest).
23. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 54
(2009) (indicating that we should strive to assure easy entry into the market); DANIEL F. SPULBER,
REGULATION AND MARKETS 138 (1989) ("[T]he possibility of competitive entry limits the profits of
incumbent firms.").
24. ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 121 (1985).
25. See, e.g., Canice Prendergast & Lars Stole, Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers:
Acquiring a Reputation for Learning, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1105, 1106 (1996) (examining investment
management decision-making process in correlation to ability to learn).
26. See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 53-54 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing regulatory controls in the transportation, energy, and
telecommunications industries).
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experience through accretions in age and scope. Part IV demonstrates that
an entity's ability to mitigate new and existing regulatory burdens is a
function of its regulatory industrial maturity, knowledge, and market
familiarity. It also demonstrates how regulatory action combined with
economies of experience in fact creates a regressive distributional impact.27
Thereafter, it reveals that the incidence of these distributional effects is
significant not only for regulated entities, but also for unregulated third
parties in society. Part V presents potential solutions and new approaches
to alleviate perverse regulatory effects through collaborative mechanisms
and regulatory sandboxes that increase information sharing and
participation of newcomers in the regulatory process. Part VI concludes by
reflecting on current and future policy discourse surrounding the effect of
government action on innovation.
II. REGULATORY COSTS
Many rules and regulations aim to repair market failures. Governments
establish new regulations in order to promote social welfare in health,28
workplace safety,29 immigration and homeland security,30 fair labor and
employment,I and environmental responsibility.32  Under the familiar
27. By "regressive," this Article refers to the reverse graduated nature of the regulatory burden,
which puts a higher burden on those with lower experience levels. The use of the phrase in this Article
is distinguished from its use in tax literature in reference to placing higher tax burdens on individuals
with a lower ability to pay. Regressive tax (regressivity), BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1856);
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKUA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER
TAX REFORM 50-51 (1996). This Article concerns itself with entities rather than the individuals who
have a property interest in entities.
28. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (an act to reform the health care system to affect hospitals, employers and primary physician
practices to drive better health outcomes, lower costs and improve accessibility); Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (an act to improve
portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets).
29. See, e.g., FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011)
(an act to improve inspections, protection and capacity to prevent food safety problems); Toxic
Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(2012)) (an act to assess and regulate new commercial chemicals before their entrance into the market);
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301) (an
act requiring drug manufacturers to provide proof of the effectiveness and safety of their drugs before
approval and requiring drug advertising to disclose accurate information about side effects).
30. See, e.g., REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) (an act pertaining to
security, authentication, and issuance procedure standards for the state driver's licenses and
identification (ID) cards, as well as various immigration issues pertaining to terrorism); Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (an act to reform
intelligence-related activities such as authorizing requests for a criminal history record); Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002) (an act to
improve information sharing in regards to the issuance of Visas and admission of aliens).
31. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 201) (an act that establishes standard employment conditions such as minimum wage,
866
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Pigouvian analysis, "where there is reason to believe that the free play of
self-interest will cause an amount of resources to be invested different from
the amount that is required in the best interest of the national dividend,
there is a prima facie case for public intervention."3 3 Nevertheless,
regulation that originally benefits society can be socially undesirable if it
becomes too costly.34
Cost-benefit analyses consider whether net benefits from regulations
outweigh their net costs.3 5 This Article takes a different approach. It begins
by assuming current regulations are socially efficient for the initial purpose
overtime pay, and youth employment); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, § 11, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (an act to assure nondiscrimination in
employment or equal employment opportunity).
32. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (an act to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
nation's waters and wetlands); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (an act to
improve, monitor, and control air pollution).
33. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 331 (4th ed. 1962).
34. See, e.g., Chris Kirkham, Home Builders Say They Are Squeezed by Rising Compliance
Costs, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/home-builders-say-they-are-squeezed-
by-rising-compliance-costs-1462613
401 (stating that regulatory fees have increased by nearly 30%
since 2011). Welfare Economics literature stipulates that society should enact only those regulations
that provide a net social benefit. See, e.g., Memorandum from the SEC Div. of Risk, Strategy, and Fin.
Innovation & Off. of Gen. Counsel, Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemakings 3
(Mar. 16, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfiguidance econanalysecrulemaking.pdf
(observing that independent agencies are not bound to the cost-benefit analyses that are binding on
executive agencies, but merely encouraged to follow them); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward A Framework of Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983,
1985 (2013) (suggesting the need to carefully analyze the function of the cost-benefit analysis mandate
in Section 106 of the National Securities Market Improvement Act); Jason Scott Johnston, A Game
Theoretic Analysis ofAlternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1343, 1351 (2002) (reviewing regulatory mandates through cost-benefit analysis and game theory);
Thomas 0. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental
Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998-2000 (2002) (focusing on the empirical basis for cost
assessments that go into regulatory impact analyses); Alexander Wendt, Constructing International
Politics, 20 INT'L SECURITY 71, 73 (1995) (discussing compliance in the international security context
through cost-benefit analysis).
35. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL,
HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1996); GEORGE W. DOUGLAS &
JAMES C. MILLER, III, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY
(1974) (analyzing a cost analysis of regulation in the airline industry); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, DIANE
T. BERLINER & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOT, TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: 31 CASE STUDIES
(Inst. for Int'l Econs. 1986) (a cost benefit analysis of international trade barriers); Harold Demsetz,
Barriers to Entry, 72 AMER. EcoN. REV. 56 (1982) (defining regulatory decision-making as "defining
which costs of undertaking activities are socially desirable and which are not"); James M. Griffin, The
Welfare Implications of Externalities and Price Elasticities for Telecommunications Pricing, 64 REV.
ECON. & STATS. 59 (1982) (reviewing welfare losses in the U.S. telecommunication industry); Robert
W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits ofRegulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON
REG. 233, 261-70 (1991) (reviewing several regulatory cost-benefit studies); Steven A. Morrison et al.,
Fundamental Flaws of Social Regulation: The Case of Airplane Noise, 42 J.L. & ECON. 723 (1999)
(analyzing air traffic regulation from a cost-benefit analysis perspective); Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-
Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205 (2004) (debating how to monetize life-years
and willingness to pay in cost-benefit analyses).
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for which they were created. Thereafter, it outlines the composition of the
costs associated with such regulations and examines their distributional
effects on current and future market players.36
A. Direct Regulatory Costs
Regulation is costly.7 Compliance costs derive from the need to obey
rules or to bear penalties. Both are integral parts of a regulated
environment. For example, environmental regulations necessitate
purchasing capital-intensive technology to reduce emissions. In another
case, compliance costs may be created by a new rule requiring a different
notice to customers about health risks. The regulatory action imposes a new
cost to review and correct current health notices.39
The regulatory norm may also necessitate the creation of new processes
and procedures. It could require revising the production process to comply
with the regulated range of behaviors. It might even entail altering
distribution schemes to incorporate the new regulatory change.40 For
example, a new emissions standard may call for altering the production
process to use less thermal units of energy.4 1 Similarly, a new health
privacy rule may compel the modification of information transfers with
customers and third parties in order to remain compliant.42 All of these
changes may affect the price of producing a product.
36. These costs are divided into direct financial costs (compliance, enforcement, and
administrative) and indirect costs (informational and opportunity) as a side effect of regulation. See,
e.g., David M. Cutler & Brigitte C. Madrian, Labor Market Responses to Rising Health Insurance
Costs: Evidence on Hours Worked, 29 RAND J. ECON. 509, 510 (1998) (examining labor markets'
response to rising fixed costs in health insurance costs); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker
Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1749, 1787 (1990) (noting that law entities incur fixed health insurance costs that do not vary with a
partner's billable hours).
37. RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 122 (2005).
38. On technology-enforcing mechanisms, see Christoph Mfiller & Andr6 Nijsen, Development
of an RIA Coordination with a Focus on SME and Start-Ups, in BUSINESS REGULATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY 269 (A. Nijsen et al. eds., 2009).
39. See generally C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small
Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 8 (2004) (reviewing
administrative requirements of small business).
40. See David Sunding & David Zilberman, Consideration of Economics Under Cahfornia's
Porter-Cologne Act, 13 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 73, 86 (2007) (discussing the
regulatory transaction costs of regulation effects on the need to alter production technologies or
substitute inputs).
41. See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central
Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1339, 1390 n.170 (1993)
("[T]he new source performance standards for fossil fuel-fired power plants apply only to sources that
consume at least 250 million British Thermal Units of heat energy per year, an amount roughly
equivalent to 73 megawatts of heat energy.").
42. See infra Part V.B.
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Regulations can also impose administrative filing and disclosure
requirements. In its recent Information Collection Budget, the Office of
Management and Budget reported that 9.45 billion hours are annually
required to complete regulatory paperwork.43 Procuring, researching, and
understanding regulations are not trivial costs. These actions may be
carried out internally by employees or externally by compliance agencies.
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements are another major cost imposed
on regulated entities.45 These costs usually include, but are not limited to,
compiling the necessary information, training employees, conferring with
professionals, and preparing reports.4 6 These administrative costs result
from compliance with the legal duties to furnish information and can be
high and fixed, regardless of the entity's production level.
Conforming to regulations also involves strategic and opportunity costs
because making one choice means renouncing the other courses of action.47
Opportunity costs include the time and money not spent on an alternative
available action. Given multiple competing opportunities, the best choice is
the one that maximizes surplus while taking into account the loss of all
other opportunities from foregone actions.4 8 Opportunistic regulated parties
may invest time and resources on ways to evade regulations.49 For
example, firms may attempt to shorten or avoid the agency approval
process to their benefit. Others may advocate for increased regulatory entry
barriers for competitive advantages.50 They may lobby for higher entry
barriers to stifle competition.51
43. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOvERNMENT 2 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archieves.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/icb/
icb_2014.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, The Limits of the International Tax Regime as a Commitment
Projector, 33 VA. TAX REV. 59, 108 (2013) (describing the administration of a new tax regulation);
Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 703, 731 (2007) (noting the cost of an external consulting firm to implement new controls under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
45. See generally Federal Paperwork Requirements: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Gov't Reg.
and Paperwork of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 96th Cong. I (1979).
46. See infra Part H.B.
47. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing ofInputs Sold to Competitors:
Rejoinder and Epilogue, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 177, 184-85 (1995) (discussing opportunity costs
connected with "virtual regulation," i.e. costs stemming from the threat of regulation).
48. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 119 (15th ed. 1995); see
also Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later
Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REv. 267, 287-89 (1993) (discussing how
policymakers should assess opportunity costs of environmental regulation).
49. See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 11I COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1646 (2011).
50. See also infra Part IV.A.; Regulate Us, Please, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 1994, at 67 (noting
established firms' attempts to impose stricter regulations to increase newcomers' barriers to entry).
51. See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS I 40-41 (1988) (discussing the need to take into account the opportunity cost or market-
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Finally, a prominent opportunity cost associated with regulation is
administrative delay. Although firms aim to execute their decisions quickly
and without delays, regulations can create substantial deferments.52 At
times, entities are forced to postpone productive activities until their
administrative staff can vet a lengthy assurance process.53 In extreme cases,
a permanent loss of opportunities can occur because of an undue regulatory
burden resulting in unexpected suspensions or monetary costs.
B. Indirect Regulatory Costs
Besides imposing direct costs, regulations can be conceptualized as a
system of knowledge about rules that determine who might take an action
under certain circumstances.5 4  Regulated entities incur indirect
informational costs to learn, interpret, and comply with the requirements of
a regulation. Thereafter, they must create protocols and keep abreast of new
or revised regulations.5 This includes developing practices and putting
monitoring systems into place to stay informed of regulatory changes.
Nevertheless, third parties outside of regulators' reaches are also
affected by regulatory realities. Unregulated third parties incur incidental
informational costs in addition to those shouldered by regulated entities. In
order to minimize their risk, third parties often are required to monitor the
compliance of regulated parties or seek remedies in the case of non-
compliance. This is especially true when the regulation aims to protect
third-party dealings with regulated entities.
Consider the use of T's airbags in Mazda cars. If the airbags are subject
to specific safety regulations that might inadvertently affect the quality of
M's product and M's reputation, M will invest more time in deciding which
airbags to buy and whether each part of the airbag complies with its
specific industry regulation. It may be more efficient for M to abandon the
use of T's products or to vertically integrate with T to minimize risks to its
based influence resulting from regulations); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1969 n.273 (1995) (discussing the need to compensate incumbents in case of
regulatory entry barriers for the opportunity cost of alternative uses of the facilities used to supply
access).
52. See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward A New Form of Intellectual
Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1389 (2011) (noting that "regulatory delays can potentially
ameliorate the problem of orphan business models for drugs").
53. See generally GLENN BLACKMON, INCENTIVE REGULATION AND THE REGULATION OF
INCENTIVES 36 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1994).
54. See generally Joshua A. T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 857 (2015) (in a
similar manner conceptualizing property as data).
55. Id. at 856 (defining "protocols" as "[p]rocedures for quickly, effectively, securely and
cheaply communicating information").
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product reputation.56 Thus, the regulatory action causes unregulated third-
parties to incur added information and administrative costs. In some cases,
these costs may dissuade unregulated third-parties from completing a
transaction with a regulated party or encourage (competitively undesired)
vertical integration between producers and vendors.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the regulator incurs significant costs in
the process of establishing a rule. Regulatory agencies may sustain major
costs at the promulgation and enforcement stages. These costs are central to
the decision of whether to adopt a rule. They include, but are not limited to,
creating and sustaining norms and the cost of researching alternatives to
regulation.58  Once enacted, regulatory agencies receive feedback on
regulations and incur monitoring costs when appraising and updating these
directives. During this process, agencies may need to issue guidelines and
clarify rules to complement and explain the primary regulation.
Enforcement, detection, and auditing expenses are other costs
associated with regulatory action. Strategic planning and avoidance by
regulated parties increase cosis for regulated entities and for regulators.
With the need to close loopholes comes added complexity. Convoluted
rules increase administrative and compliance costs for regulated entities
and the regulatory agencies that oversee them. The next Part discusses
specific factors that affect the distributional nature of the abovementioned
costs.
III. ECONOMIES OF EXPERIENCE
A dynamic process of learning creates economies of experience.
Regulatory costs fluctuate for each entity according to factors such as
managers' education and background, the entity's product progression, and
other industrial and financial conditions.5 9 Yet, all else being equal, as
56. See Mike Spector, Business News: Car Makers Vow To Boost Safety, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16,
2016, at B4 (reporting that "[i]n September, GM paid a $900 million penalty to settle a Justice
Department criminal probe of a defective ignition switch linked to 124 deaths.... Meantime, Fiat
Chrysler suffered fines resulting from regulatory investigations"); Mazda to Recall Vehicles Linked to
Defective Airbags, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 9, 2016, at B2 (noting "[t]he airbag recalls are among the largest in
United States automotive history, encompassing 23 million airbag inflaters in 19 million vehicles
manufactured by 12 car companies").
57. Kaplow refers to these costs as "cost[s] of inquiry." Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 583 (1992) (describing the regulatory costs of the inquiry
into rules and standards).
58. Such as no regulation at all or creating a rule that renders a certain outcome as socially and
reasonably desirable. For example, under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12, Pub. L.
No. 96-354 § 3(a), 94 Stat. 1165 (1980), every government agency needs to assess and mitigate the
discriminatory effect of regulation on small business.
59. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2013) (examining the ability of entities to
2018] 871
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 69:4:859
explained herein, some factors affect the economies of experience curve
more than others do.
A. Age
Market and production information is subject to economies that
contribute to movements along dimensions of experience. The passage of
time is beneficial to obtain such knowledge. Here, "economies of age"
refers to the notion that newcomers incur immediate, higher learning costs
compared to veteran firms.60 Consequently, economies of age can be
beneficial to achieving dual marketplace familiarity advantages. First, old-
timers benefit from conversance within the market by other market players.
Second, veteran entities also gain by having knowledge of the market's
industrial and regulatory environment.
As the age of the entity increases, it has more time to establish positive
customer relationships and acquaintance with its products.61 Generally,
firms that enter the market early enjoy a substantial "first-mover
advantage" over later entrants.62 This may result from practical limitations
63on access and delays associated with incomplete production knowledge.
exit based on several factors including financial condition of affiliated entities in the group); Serguey
Braguinsky, Steven Klepper & Atsushi Ohyama, High-Tech Entrepreneurship, 55 J. LAW & ECON. 869,
881 (2012) (noting that the "amount of education of entrepreneurs in the technology-related sample is
also higher than in the paid-work sample").
60. Under socialism, the law of economy of time is expressed in the reduction of time required to
produce and prepare the necessary product. See Economy of Time, THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA
(3"' ed. 1970-79), http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Economy+of+Time,+Law+of; William
James Booth, Economies of Time: On the Idea of Time in Marx's Political Economy, 19 POL. THEO. 7,
8(1991).
61. See, e.g., Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry:
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 384, 413 (2009) ("The
economic and psychological costs to consumers of switching brands may benefit a first mover if the
first mover is able to effectively capture market share early on."); see also Dennis S. Corgill, Insider
Trading, Price Signals, and Noisy Information, 71 IND. L.J. 355, 395 (1996) (noting "the first-mover
advantage provides the reward of a limited informational monopoly"); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy,
Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333,
1367 (2009) (arguing that "[s]ize tends to cure many of the downsides of being a first mover" by
allowing absorption of the cost and diversification against he risk of failure).
62. This is pronounced for regulatory and market information. See, e.g., David M. Szymanski,
Lisa C. Troy & Sundar G. Bharadwaj, Order of Entry and Business Performance: An Empirical
Synthesis and Reexamination, 59 J. MARKETING 17 (1995) (examining the empirics of early entry and
business performance); Pieter A. VanderWerf & John. F. Mahon, Meta-Analysis of the Impact of
Research Methods on Findings of First-Mover Advantage, 43 MGMT. SC. 1510 (1997) (empirically
testing the first-mover advantage). But see Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover
Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 47-49 (1988) (noting that in other aspects "[]ate-movers may
be able to 'free-ride' on a pioneering firm's investments").
63. Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 62, at 46 (attributing the advantages of being a first-
mover to network effects, consumer switching costs, acquisition of resources, and technology
preemption); see also Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L.
872
The Cost of Inexperience
To overcome this phenomenon, newcomers need to become more efficient
in their production methods. They also may integrate with old-timers and
exit the market. This is an ordinary price of entering a market. Yet, at
times, the first-mover premium may generate market control when the
government places physical and informational restrictions on market
entry.4 From the entrepreneur's perspective, heavily regulated markets
impose high costs that sometimes render investment unattractive. This may
result in a long-term loss to society by providing greater market control to
65established entities.
Moreover, longevity can be advantageous to achieving marketplace
familiarity with its environment. The older the entity, the more time it has
had to become informed about its market and become acquainted with its
landscape. Information about the structure, composition, state of
competition, and possible failures are other examples of beneficial
knowledge of the marketplace.6 6 Because market information is a valuable
and costly factor of production, new entrants experience a net increase in
their cost-per-unit, lowering their present value of future profits. That cost
may prevent young firms from even entering the market. High-entry
barriers may be required in some industries,67 but they may be an
unintended cost in others.
REv. 255, 274 (1997) (noting that "[e]mpirical data shows that such first mover advantages function as
innovation incentives").
64. But see Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 337, 354 (2008) (noting that increased legal protection from the
government in the form of a higher degree of market exclusivity to increase the first-mover advantage
"can promote social welfare by increasing the number of experiments that private parties are willing to
undertake").
65. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 24, at 39 (finding that protection from entrepreneurial
competition does not necessarily spur entrepreneurial discovery).
66. See generally Thomas J. Dean & Robert L. Brown, Pollution Regulation as a Barrier to New
Firm Entry: Initial Evidence and Implications for Future Research, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 288, 289
(1995).
67. For example, the key entry barriers in the pharmaceutical industry are characterized as a
great deal of innovation risk to develop a drug and to complete the FDA approval process. See
generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L.
REv. 11, 15 (2004) (discussing the implications of regulatory entry barriers on pharma competition);
Mary Lou Steptoe & David Baltoby, Finding the Right Prescription: The FTC's Use of Innovative
Merger Remedies, ANTITRUST, Fall 1995, at 16, 16-17 (describing the FDA approval process as
requiring "a potential entrant [to] demonstrate the safety and efficacy of its drug through animal studies
and human clinical trials" and to "demonstrate that it can manufacture the drug in commercial lot sizes,
according to good manufacturing standards").
68. See, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Economics of Regulatory Reform:
Termination of Airline Computer Reservation System Rules, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 392 (2004)
(examining airline computer reservation regulations and concluding that the traditional approach to
evaluating the merits of a regulation exhibits a bias toward rule retention by assuming that the relevant
alternative to regulation is a state of laissez-faire).
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Veteran entities enjoy economies of age in the gathering and
processing of information.6 9 Experienced entities become well-versed in
industry rules and protocols to accommodate their production process.70 As
such, they tend to adapt faster to changes in regulations or new rules.71
They have built relationships with policymakers and cultivated connections
with other market players. As will be discussed later, they possess greater
influence over the rulemaking process.7 2
There are high informational costs for obtaining licenses, importing
goods, hiring employees, and managing financial transactions that not only
control the market, but also limit entrance into it.73 Professionals, such as
lawyers, bankers, and compliance agents, are costly. As the next Part will
demonstrate, they may even be utilized to increase the marginal costs of
newcomers and serve as internal subsidies to existing market players.7 4
B. Scope
Economies of scope are similar to economies of age when observed in
connection with market experience. However, the focus of economies of
scope is not on the longevity of the entity, but rather its previous interaction
with the market. It is associated with integration of production experience.
Economies of scope emanate from the creation of different but compatible
products.75 Assume that two entities, C and D, each develop a new product,
X. Entity C has already produced and distributed a related or similar
product, Z, and is well-known in the marketplace for that product. Entity C
will benefit from economies of scope over Entity D in a number of aspects.
First, due to the market's familiarity with its product, Entity C's customers
will tend to trust its new products. Second, even if Entity C is not dominant
in its market, it possesses an advantage over Entity D, due to its knowledge
69. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 309-23 (2007).
70. Id. at 342-44.
71. See generally Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged
Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1267, 1295-306 n.207 (2012) (finding that "[o]ver time, the
regulators' experience with staging will itself provide feedback information regarding which kinds of
regulation are most suited for staging and the optimal procedures to be adopted in gathering information
and modifying new rules as they are implemented").
72. See infra Part IV.A.2.
73. See MICHAEL PARKIN, EcoNOMIcS 258 (6th ed. 2003) (arguing that licenses controlling
entry creates a legal monopoly).
74. See generally Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974) (equating regulation with taxation).
75. See John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 268, 268
(1981) (discussing the multi-product cost function of economies of scope as a form of complementarity
in production).
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of production processes, regulations, market structure, marketing methods,
distribution channels, and retailer relationships that entail producing
product Z. Entity C can more easily expand the range of its products by
leveraging its existing resources, knowledge, and positive customer
experience.76
When an entity produces two or more related products, it can reduce its
overall cost-per-unit compared to entities that produce each product
separately in similar quantities. The essence of economies of scope is
expertise and specialized knowledge.78 For example, a producer of apple
juice may use existing knowledge, expertise, and equipment to produce
orange juice; thus, the cost-per-unit for the producer of both kinds of juice
decreases compared to a single-product manufacturer.
Economies of scope can result in reduced costs of production.
Information is as much of an input or resource as other factors of
production.79 As an entity accumulates knowledge on production methods,
the learning effect decreases its cost-per-unit.80 They also can occur
through reducing distribution and marketing costs by using existing
customers and utilizing the geographic concentration of customers.8 1
In addition to a lower cost-per-unit for related products, multi-product
entities can exploit their market familiarity by bundling their products or
engaging in anticompetitive price manipulation.82 There are many
examples of this phenomenon. For instance, Google and Microsoft often
offer similar products to their customers. They use their "captive
audience" to introduce new and related products to reduce their advertising
76. Diseconomies of scope and age can occur when customers have a negative experience. See
Kevin M. Warsh, Corporate Spinoffs and Mass Tort Liability, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 675, 714
(1995) (noting cases where management became preoccupied with tobacco litigation which transformed
into a factor of diseconomies of scale).
77. Nevertheless, economies of scope do not necessitate that goods be sold together. See Ian
Ayres, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J. 109, 117-18 (1985).
78. See Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Finn
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1123, 1201 (2007)
(advocating that knowledge "generates hypotheses about when vertical integration or market
contracting will take place").
79. See KIRZNER, COMPETITION, supra note 18, at 90.
80. CLIFF PRATrEN, THE COMPETITIVENESS OF SMALL FIRMS 14, 18 (1991).
81. Id. at 15.
82. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Predatory Bundling and the Exclusionary Standard, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1231, 1238-40 (2010). For example, a "price squeeze" refers to an anti-competitive
phenomenon by which a firm with a monopoly at the wholesale level and competition at the retail level
manipulates its wholesale prices in order to "squeeze" competitors out of the retail market. See John E.
Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause ofAction, 31 UCLA L. REV. 563, 565
(1984).
83. See David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 285, 297 (2008).
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and marketing costs.84 Google advertises its product Google Calendar to its
current Gmail customers. Microsoft regularly bundles new products (such
as OneNote) with existing product upgrades to introduce the new products
to existing Office and Windows customers. Moreover, Google allows
software developers to use its application programming interfaces in
exchange for the right to advertise in their gadgets.86 These programs not
only are compatible with Google current products but also interconnect and
cross-reference to Google's other products. For example, since Orbitz
updated its website, it uses Google Maps's interface. Now, Orbitz users
are provided information on not only traffic but also weather and parking
through Google's other applications.
Firms with market proficiency can more easily expand the range of
their products and entrench customers' reliance on these products.8 9 This is
achieved by using their existing retailer relationships and customer base.90
It is easier for these firms to vertically integrate with newcomers or take
over their competitors. Entities lacking economies of experience may have
no choice but to merge with entities possessing sufficient experience.
Accordingly, economies of scope can lead to market dominance and deter
market entrance.91
84. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955, 991 (2004) (noting that "[e]conomies of scope are a form of complementarity in
production" when "it is less costly to combine two or more product lines in one firm than to produce
them separately"); see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 279-303 (1982) (discussing the
advantages of existing market players).
85. On the legal implications of Microsoft bundles, see generally J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust
Rule for Software Integration, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2001).
86. Moreover, Google makes its APIs available to software developers that are writing programs
to provide other services in return for inserting advertisements on related services. Evans, supra note
83, at 297 ("Since January 2007, developers have written around 20,000 'gadgets'-mini-applications
that use the Google Gadgets API and can run on Google platforms (e.g. Google Calendar, iGoogle-a
personalized Google hom'epage, Google Desktop, Blogger, Google Maps, Orkut), which can be
embedded in any webpage, and can run on other third party applications (e.g. MyAOL)-which are
used across 100,000 Web sites.").
87. Orbitz.com Adds Google Street View Giving Its Customers a Virtual Walking Tour of a
Hotel's Neighborhood, ORBITZ.COM (Aug. 17, 2009), http://press.orbitz.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=251693
&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1 796484.
88. Id.
89. See William S. Comanor, Vertical Arrangements and Antitrust Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1153, 1161 (1987) (noting that multiproduct entities enjoy economies of scope in the distribution sector
by substantially reducing their distribution cost for their large number of products, which may have
important anti-competitive results).
90. See id. at 1162.
91. See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289, 298 (1999)
("To the extent that the innovation builds on the employer's existing technology, it is quite likely that
the employer can achieve economies of scope in connection with the innovation's commercialization,
manufacturing, and marketing.").
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Positive consumer experience with existing products in the market
naturally creates higher entry barriers for unfamiliar or undiversified
92 th exentities. In the example above, both Entities C and D are producers
competing over the same customers of new product X. Nevertheless, as
creator of the previously successful related product Z, Entity C has a scope
advantage over the new producer Entity D in the same marketplace. Many
operating systems, applications, and related software will have to be
realigned when using a new product, even if the new product is superior to
existing products in the market.93 If product X is interconnected to current
product Z with strong economies of scope, Entity D will have greater
difficulties penetrating the market.94 Path dependency and high learning
and switching costs prevent many customers from converting from a
familiar product (such as the PC computer) to a new one (the iMac
computer).95
C. Other Economies
Larger entities may have a greater ability to defray costs as well.
96
Through the operation of the law of large numbers, economies of scale
92. Paul W. MacAvoy, Daniel F. Spulber & Bruce E. Stangle, Is Competitive Entry Free?
Bypass and Partial Deregulation in Natural Gas Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 235 (1989) ("If the
incumbent has variable costs that exhibit economies of scope, the sum of the stand-alone costs of
separately serving each customer class will exceed the total costs of jointly serving all customer
classes.").
93. See, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332-
37 (1985); Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential Facilities
Doctrine and the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481, 508
(2007) ("Consumers become 'locked in' to the product because of switching costs associated with
moving from one network to another."); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REv. 641, 645-46 (1996) (arguing that the possibility of breaking out of a lock-in situation
lies in the overall efficiency and strength of the pattern created in the past); see also Maximo Langer,
The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 909 n.369
(2005) (same).
94. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government
Pricing of Unbounded Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1081, 1136 (1997) (conflating economies of scope with a natural monopoly, noting that "[a] given
production technology exhibits the property of natural monopoly if a single firm can supply the market
at lower cost than can two or more firms").
95. See Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis: A
Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 169, 173 (2013) ("Microsoft was not
simply an innocent beneficiary of high switching costs: it made strategic choices to substantially
increase switching costs. . . ."); Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 62, at 46 (noting that
consumers' loyalty toward brands may create first-mover advantage).
96. Economies of scale can occur in several ways. They include, but are not limited to, the total
output of particular products through time, the duration of production time, the rate of production, the
extent of the calibration of products, the production capacity of units of plant or machinery, and the
range of operations and stages of productions. PRATTEN, supra note 80, at 14 (enumerating the
dimensions affecting the efficiency of production).
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reduce the average unit cost as the scale of output increases.9 7 Therefore,
firms that benefit from economies of scale may have a greater capacity to
spread costs over their larger output.9 8 Economies of scale can occur in
several ways. They include, but are not limited to, the total output, the
duration of production time, the rate of production, the extent of the
calibration of products, the production capacity of plant or machinery, and
the stages of production." The bigger the entity, the better its performance
in these aspects.
The dynamic impact of economies of scale is mainly observed in
industries that involve high fixed costs. Fixed costs are expenses that are
incurred even with zero output. They do not change as a function of the
business activity within a relevant period.100 Examples of fixed costs
include capital expenditures on newly-acquired machinery and
equipment.101 Accordingly, if all entities incur the same fixed costs, those
with greater output are better able to bear them. As the dimensions of the
production scale increase, these costs can be spread over a larger output to
reduce the cost-per-unit of production.102
Nevertheless, diseconomies of scale are also possible. In such cases,
entities may see a rise, rather than a decline, in their costs as their scale
increases. This may be a result of variable costs that increase, rather than
decrease, with scale. For example, there may be a need to design, build,
and run bigger equipment and machinery as the firm increases its output. In
97. Id; see also STIGLER, supra note 19, at 71 (1968) (examining the relationship between the
scale and the rate of output of the enterprise). Stigler's main thesis is that the determination of the
optimum size of the firm is a judgment on the efficient size. Through what he coins as the "Survivor
Principal" the optimum size of the enterprise is ascertained empirically, either by a comparison of the
actual costs of firms of different sizes, a comparison of rates of return on investment, or a calculation of
probable costs of enterprises of different sizes in light of technological information. Id. at 72.
98. See Milton Z. Kafoglis, Mandated Costs: Impact on Small Business, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF GOVERNMENT-MANDATED COSTS 11 (1978) (arguing that small businesses are not effective in
mitigating regulatory costs); B. Peter Pashigian, A Theory of Prevention and Legal Defense with an
Application to the Legal Costs of Companies, 25 J.L. & ECON. 247, 261 (1982) (finding economies of
scale in both in-house and outside legal costs in a study of 500 of the top 750 Fortune companies).
99. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcs 221-24 (1989) (noting
that economies of scope typically arise from joint usage of fixed resources); see also R. Preston
McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, What Is a Barrier to Entry?, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
461, 461 (2004).
100. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS 439-52 (Bonnie E. Lieberman et al. eds., 11th ed. 1980)
(discussing marginal cost and utility, cost curves, and shutdown and breakeven points).
101. PRATTEN, supra note 80, at 16.
102. In the case of diseconomies of scale, some of those costs may be increased as a result of the
need to design, build, and run bigger equipment and machinery. Increased scale may be disadvantaged
by the spread of the variable cost. It could be (and often is) the case that dVc/dx>0. Id.
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this case entities with enlarged scale may be disadvantaged by the upsurge
in the variable cost.10 3
In The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase discussed diseconomies of
scale. He described various factors that may increase, rather than decrease,
transaction costs of larger firms:
Apart from variations in the supply price of factors of production to
firms of different sizes, it would appear that the costs of organising
and the losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in
the spatial distribution of the transactions organised, in the
dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the probability of changes
in the relevant prices. As more transactions are organised by an
entrepreneur, it would appear that the transactions would tend to be
either different in kind or in different places. This furnishes an
additional reason why efficiency will tend to decrease as the firm
gets larger.104
One can imagine diseconomies of experience transpiring in a like
manner. Consider the U-shaped curve below, with a two-dimensional
mirror arc. It describes the cost-per-unit of production as a function of
increases in the marketplace experience of the entity.




103. See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Organizational Diseconomies of Scale, 4 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 399, 400 (1995) (pointing to increases in the hierarchical distance between
the information source and the decision maker as the reason for this phenomenon).
104. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 396-97 (1937).
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As the economies of experience of the entity increase, its cost-per-unit
decreases. This is a result of the forces of age and scope. Nevertheless, in
some cases we may witness diseconomies of experience occurring at the
right end of the spectrum. After the marginal cost-per-unit reaches an
optimal level and ceases to fall, it begins to increase with age and scope.
From this moment on, old-timers begin to produce goods and services at an
increased cost-per-unit.0 5 Their ability to defray costs may decrease as they
mature.
Some of the factors that may contribute to diseconomies of experience
can be traced to increased bureaucracy, duplication of efforts, and office
politicS.10 6 For example, over a period of years, power and social
networking within an organization could hamper changes that benefit the
organization.107 Veteran employees and unions who have organizational
influence may serve their own personal interests, without regard to the
interests of the organization.0 8 Yet, aside from the conditions mentioned
above, which disadvantage some old-timers, in most cases, economies of
experience disadvantage newcomers.
To conclude, marketplace experience may offer a significant benefit to
those who possess that knowledge. Economies of experience in age and
scope often afford old-timers a market advantage over newcomers. This
advantage can manifest itself in an increased ability to defray costs in the
production or distribution process. The next Part will demonstrate the
function of such economies in the context of regulation. It also
demonstrates the incidence of regulatory transaction costs on unregulated
parties that transact with these afflicted entities.
105. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles (1939), reprinted in THE ENTREPRENEUR,
CLASSIC TEXTS BY JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER 294 (2011) (speaking of "big, particularly of 'giant,'
concerns which often are but shells within which an ever-changing personnel may go from innovation
to innovation").
106. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 86 (Michael L. Tushman & Andrew H. Van de Ven eds., 1997) (claiming
that established firms are captive to the financial structure and organizational culture which block
timely investment in the next wave of destructive technology rendering them archaic); Todd R. Zenger,
Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency Problems and the Allocation of
Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size, 40 MGMT. Sa. 708, 709 (1994) (examining scale
diseconomies and offering employment contracts as an explanation for diseconomies of scale in R&D).
107. See Carrie R. Leana & Harry J. van Buren III, Organizational Social Capital and
Employment Practices, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 538, 539 (1999) (discussing employment practices as
primary mechanisms by which social capital is fostered or discouraged within organizations).
108. Id; see also Mark C. Bolino, William H. Turnley & James M. Bloodgood, Citizenship
Behavior and The Creation ofSocial Capital in Organizations, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 505, 506 (2002)
(suggesting that as opposed to politics, citizenship behaviors enhance firm functioning by contributing
to the development of social capital in organizations); Janine Nahapiet & Sumantra Ghoshal, Social
Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 242, 243
(1998) (arguing that a firm's social capital is a critical source of sustainable organizational advantage).
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IV. REGULATORY ASYMMETRIES
Regulatory burdens affect some entities more adversely than others. An
important type of cost that is often omitted in the literature is the influence
of government action on newcomers. This Part shows that regulatory action
disadvantages this specific cohort of entities and their unregulated
affiliates. Assuming that there are instances in which regulation is the most
efficient means to achieve a certain cause,109 what is the effect of a
regulation on the cohort of newcomers? Who eventually bears the
economic cost of governmental action?"o This Part attempts to answer
these questions without referring to notions of "fairness" regarding old-
timers (who used to be newcomers) and had to endure similar asymmetries
themselves. As opposed to normal entry costs (equipment and labor),
regulations are government tools aimed at protecting society, but, as this
Part demonstrates, can be utilized to provide market domination and
ultimately harm society.
A. Regulated Parties
When regulatory norms affect certain parties more than others, the
greater affected party's competitive position may deteriorate based solely
on the regulatory action. Asymmetrical distribution of regulatory costs
creates significant competitive hurdles. In extreme cases, the economic
effect of certain regulations can be so perverse as to hamper innovation by
inhibiting entrepreneurs from entering the market at all.'
1. Firsthand Learning
Becoming knowledgeable about the industry's rules and guidelines is
significant in the production process. Certain regulations may affect or
109. By "efficiency," I refer to the benefits of the regulatory action exceeding its known costs.
But see MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
65-68 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1988) (finding that many statutes explicitly place regulatory goals above
cost).
110. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Surprising Incidence of a Tax on Pure Rent: A New Answer
to an Old Question, 85 J. POL. ECON. 349, 350 (1977) (the burden, or "incidence," of the corporate tax
falls on labor); Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. EcON.
215, 216 (1962) (demonstrating that the corporate tax burden falls on all investors, not merely corporate
investors); James M. Poterba, Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise Taxes, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 325, 325 (1989).
111. Miller & Nijsen, supra note 38, at 282 (defining "irritation costs" as the effect of regulation
hindering the entrepreneur at the highest degree in his activities).
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even significantly alter the production process.112 Having to research,
examine, and comply with regulations that govern the market increases the
initial compliance and administrative costs for an inexperienced firm. As
such, regulatory costs fall more heavily on inexperienced entities. 113
Regulatory knowledge is crucial in preventing non-compliance or
regulatory default.114 All entities must remain informed of new or revised
regulations, interpret them to determine whether they apply, and devise
compliance strategies. "[W]ritten . .. by lawyers for lawyers," regulations
are often too complex for business owners to comprehend."5 Entities must
understand a significant body of regulations to determine what rules apply
and how to avoid non-compliance.1 1 6 The yearly cost of complying to U.S.
federal government regulations is estimated as $10,000 per employee. This
cost amounts to over $2 trillion each year, an amount equal to 12 percent of
GDP.'17 Although obtaining market information is a calculated cost, the
literature has largely overlooked the distributive effects of regulatory
knowledge on newcomers.
Although newcomers might be more nimble in their ability to adapt to
new business conditions," this may not be true regarding regulation. New
112. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 792-806 (1993) (reviewing environmental
regulations' disproportionate impact on minority and poor communities); see also supra Part I.A.
113. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 1018 (2006) (describing the effect of new internal revenue regulations
as "undesirabl[y] increas[ing] the overall tax burden on startups"); Robert B. Thompson & Donald C.
Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1622 (2013) ("If securities regulation is indeed severely discouraging to
entrepreneurs, this in all likelihood dominates as a strategy. The resulting threat to public markets like
NASDAQ and NYSE is palpable.").
114. See, e.g., Jukka Simili et al., Biodiversity Protection in Private Forests: An Analysis of
Compliance, 26 J. ENVTL. L. 83, 90 (2014) ("One of the potential reasons leading to unintentional non-
compliance is the lack of specific regulatory knowledge and expertise among regulatees.").
115. The Impact of Federal Occupational Safety and Health Requirements on Small Business:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Reg., Bus. Opportunities, and Energy of the House Comm. on Small
Bus., 102d Cong. 38 (1992) (testimony of John B. Moran).
116. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis
Means for the Regulation ofLawyers, 35 S. TEx. L. REV. 639, 667 (1994) ("Where protocols have been
approved by regulators, compliance should insulate law firms from liability if their clients fail.").
117. W. MARK CRAIN & NICOLE V. CRAIN, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION TO THE U.S.
ECONOMY, MANUFACTURING, AND SMALL BUSINESS, A REPORT FOR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS 1 (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.nam.org/Data-and-Reports/Cost-of-Federal-
Regulations/Federal-Regulation-Full-Study.pdf.
118. See, e.g., Sunil Gupta, John Paul MacDuffie & David J. Reibstein, Roundtable Discussion
on B2B Exchanges, ANTITRUST, Fall 2000, at 8, 14 ("Much of the dot.com world believes that such an
entity will move too slowly and face too much internal bickering to be successful, particularly where
more nimble and creative newcomers can nibble away pieces of the market."); Michael E. Levine,
Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 393, 406 (1987) (describing the concern that high costs make "firms overweight, possibly
arthritic, dinosaurs, threatened by nimble, lean, and aggressive new-entrant carriers"); Jane K. Winn,
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entities endure higher compliance costs than older ones.
119 They incur
additional outlays to learn the regulatory environment of their new market
or industry.120 Complex regulatory paperwork, multifaceted procedures,
and cumbersome guidelines are unfamiliar territories to a new entity. It
needs to spend either time or capital to obtain such information.
12 1
Thereafter, it needs to monitor and follow changes in regulations. Early on
in the process, it needs to figure out how to conform to regulation. Thus,
young firms have significant upfront costs that include, but are not limited
to, spending time or money learning administrative facts and procedures,
obtaining legal advice, and paying fines and penalties for non-
compliance. 122
Therefore, the combined impact of economies of experience and
regulation results in a greater burden on those unfamiliar with a market or
its regulatory environment. Newcomers are often overwhelmed by other
goals, such as developing their product and penetrating the market.
Bureaucratic processes result in more complex and intensive regulation,
unnecessary delays, penalties, prohibitive costs, and increasing data
requirements.123 These hurdles may create such high costs that new entrants
are not able to meet price competition from existing entities in the market,
leading to their failure. 12 4 In extreme cases, regulations decrease the
incentive for new entities to penetrate the market.1
25
Regulatory knowledge that has been obtained and written off by old-
timers gives them a distinct advantage over newcomers. Accordingly,
Making XML Pay: Revising Existing Electronic Payments Law to Accommodate Innovation, 53 SMU L.
REV. 1477, 1483 (2000) ("Given the growing mismatch between the rapid innovation now taking place
in Internet commerce and the glacial pace of change in the world of legacy electronic payment systems,
there would appear to be ample opportunities for newer and more nimble competitors to move in and
gain market share.").
119. See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 J.
CORP. L. 347, 386 (2014) ("Younger firms are likely to spend more on compliance than older ones.").
120. Id.
121. See Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 580 (2012)
(noting that young firms suffer upfront higher compliance costs).
122. See Kafoglis, supra note 98, at 111 (arguing that small businesses are not effective in
mitigating regulatory costs); B. Peter Pashigian, A Theory of Prevention and Legal Defense with an
Application to the Legal Costs ofCompanies, 25 J.L. & ECON. 247, 261 (1982) (finding economies of
scale in both in-house and outside legal costs in a study of 500 of the top 750 Fortune companies).
123. Mary K. Olson, Explaining Regulatory Behavior in the FDA: Political Control vs. Agency
Discretion, in 7 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 71, 73 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 1996) (illustrating how excessive compliance barriers pose
threats to the development of new entities).
124. Id.
125. See Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process
Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1372 (1990) ("Regulations such as minimum wage and
maximum hours statutes, land-use restrictions, price controls, and barriers to market entry all reduce the
supply of 'product' by increasing the marginal cost of producing the relevant goods and services.").
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established firms possess a greater ability to handle regulatory variance due
to their economies of experience. They can more easily spread over time
and preexisting output.
As it pertains to scope, a single-product entity is more likely to be in an
inferior regulatory position to an entity with two or more related products
that can be produced or retailed using similar methods.12 6 Firms with
increased economies of experience either have more regulatory knowledge
or employ skilled employees who are able to maneuver such information.
They have strategic protocols in place to learn and comply with existing
regulations.12 7 As a result, their superior information improves their
competitive position. Their regulatory expertise provides them with more
opportunities to diversify their products (scope), suppliers, and customers.
This may allow them to develop a greater position in the market.
2. Rulemaking Process
Federal regulations are often created through a process of notice-and-
comment.128 Naturally, the input from this process comes from existing
entities in the marketplace.129  Moreover, regulatory agencies often
correspond informally with representatives of interested groups or
constituents who have captured their attention.130 Trade associations and
old-timer leaders of regulated industry often participate and share the cost
of filing comments during the notice-and-comment period. These trade
associations are powerful repeat players with the financial ability to
undertake expensive litigation to challenge new rules. For example, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a major lobbying force, spends considerable
resources on lobbying the White House, Congress, and regulatory agencies
126. See Dillbary, supra note 82, at 1238 (arguing that a multi-product manufacturer may have
an advantage due to its ability to bundle products and price discriminate).
127. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEx. L. REV. 227, 230 (2010) ("[W]ell-
established companies with strong governance structures engage in more aggressive regulatory planning
than start-ups or closely held firms.").
128. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (prescribing notice-and-comment procedures); Kristin E.
Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 466 (2013) (describing the
administrative process of notice-and-comment in Treasury regulations); see also Martha Dragich,
GRAS-Fed Americans: Sick of Lax Regulation of Food Additives, 49 IND. L. REV. 305, 315 (2016)
(calling for full notice-and-cormment in food additive regulation).
129. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming A Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 10 (2013) ("For example, there is the possibility that relatively larger or more well-
established [entities] might exert disproportionate influence on the SRO and manipulate the
organization into imposing costs on relatively smaller or less established [entities]. In such a way, self-
regulation might also give rise to anticompetitive behavior.").
130. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992)
(suggesting that agencies do not use the formal notice-and-comment process to obtain public input, but
rather rely upon "informal meetings with trade associations and other constituency groups").
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on legal matters.131 Frequent interactions between old-timers and
employees at regulating agencies often result in old-timers winning seats
on advisory councils, which provide them with advantages in managing
regulatory compliance issues.132
Newcomers and young entities arrive later in the rulemaking process.
As a result, they lack the knowledge, resources, or agency relationships to
exploit, learn, or affect administrative rulemaking.13 3 They rarely attend,
participate, or get involved in administrative rulemaking.134 Their inability
to influence this process places them at a distinct disadvantage.
Accordingly, these entities remain ignorant of upcoming new rules until
they are already in place or when faced with a compliance default.1 35
The Allied Tube case is an example of the importance of familiarity
with the different factors of the rule-making process.13 6 In that case,
respondent Indian Head was a newcomer manufacturer of innovative
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) tubes that were easier to handle and safer in
contact with exposed wires.137 Indian Head submitted a proposal to the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) to list its new product as an
acceptable electrical conduit under the National Electrical Code (the
Code).138 This was a crucial step for Indian Head, because the Code was
131. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 41 (reporting the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent $21 million on lobbying regulatory matters).
132. See Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and Contractarian Paradigms in the Uneasy
Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 178 (1996)
("One of the most powerful influences on whether play between lawyers and regulators will evolve
toward mutual cooperation, mutual defection, or some other equilibrium, is whether the players have an
opportunity to negotiate before play begins."); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
133. This depends on market conditions and natural monopolies, such as cable and television
systems that use their first-mover advantage to prevent further entry.
134. Murray Weidenbaum, Improving the Public Policy Climate for Midsize Business by
Reforming Government, in 10 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 1, 6 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 1998) (stating that participating in academic-like
rulemaking meetings is a rare luxury for certain entities).
135. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 107, 110 (2010) (arguing that the "regulatory
framework" of the SEC "is too cumbersome for early-stage" startups); Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance,
and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1657, 1705 (2002)
(discussing national regulatory regimes regarding the differences among heterogeneous parties in the
international arena); Fleischer, supra note 127, at 230 ("Large companies that can afford elite law firms
employ more aggressive deal structures that push the regulatory frontier."); Kenneth W. Starr,
Leviathan: The Federal Republic and the Challenge to Freedom, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1639, 1646
(2005) ("Local governments restrict entrepreneurship and start-up businesses by means of regulations,
licensing requirements, and fees.").
136. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).




adopted into law by many state and local governments.139 It was widely
accepted by insurers and contractors as identifying acceptable electrical
products.140 The prospect of approving PVC pipes as an acceptable conduit
threatened old-timer Allied Tube (Allied), then the nation's largest
producer of steel conduit. 141 Accordingly, it met with more than 200
members of the steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and its
independent sales agents.142 They decided to pack the upcoming annual
meeting of the NFPA with new members whose only function would be to
vote against the PVC tube proposal.143 Allied alone recruited 155 people
including employees, executives, sales agents, the agents' employees,
employees from two divisions that did not sell electrical products, and the
wife of a national sales director.1" Along with other manufacturers, they
paid over $100,000 for the membership, registration, and attendance
expenses of these new voters.14 5 This plan was successful, and Indian
Head's proposal to include PVC pipes in the Code was denied.14 6
Indian Head sued Allied for violation of the Sherman Act.147 The
District Court determined that Allied was protected under Noerr-
Pennington immunity doctrine because it used acceptable standards of
political action to influence the NFPA. 14 8 Indian Head appealed the
decision, and the appellate court reversed.14 9 Allied appealed again, and the
Supreme Court, in a split decision, affirmed the appellate court's
holding.so
This litigation saga demonstrates the regulatory obstacles that entities
lacking economies of experience in regulation face. It exemplifies the
power of old-timers to strategically block innovations through the
rulemaking process. It leaves one wondering how many other ideas and
disruptive technologies encountered such strong opposition from old-timers
with influence over the regulator. Our economy and society as a whole lose
when innovations are placed on hold or barred from entering the
139. Id at 495.
140. Id.
141. Id at 496.
142. Id
143. Id
144. Id at 497.
145. Id
146. Id. at 498.
147. Id. at 497.
148. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects petitioning of the government from Sherman Act
scrutiny. Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 560 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
149. Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938, 939 (2d Cir. 1987), af'd,
484 U.S. 492 (1988).
150. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 492.
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marketplace. It reflects poorly on the government when its action might be
one of the reasons for this outcome.
Not all newcomers possess the resources and stamina necessary for
prolonged litigation. Unlike Indian Head, they usually lack sufficient
administrative and legal staff. They do not have timely information, access
to compliance strategies, and negotiation power in the rulemaking
process. Newcomers are either unaware or occupied, and are left to
submit their ideas and views through the lengthy notice-and-comment
period.152 Costs of obtaining regulatory information and developing
strategic protocols to stay compliant are elevated for these entities. They
often contract with others to promote their regulatory affairs; thus, they
face increased regulatory costS.15 3 Economies of experience, therefore,
provide a competitive advantage for existing market players. In fact, as the
next Subpart reveals, it is in old-timers' interests to advocate for market
controls that hamper the entry of new entities.154 Economists have long
noted the systematic incentives of old-timers to encourage further market
constraints and hamper competition.155
3. Regulatory Capture
Nobel Prize-winning economist George Stigler has long developed his
model of "economic regulation" to denote government intervention in the
market.'56 Realizing its effect over the industry and constituents' welfare,
he argued, regulated parties naturally will seek to cast their influence over
regulatory agencies.57 Also known as "regulatory capture," his theory
151. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for
Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 353 (2005) (arguing
that "[k]nowledge of the potential for influence and bias in the rulemaking process (as components of
an impartiality analysis). .. influence[s] the calculation of legal transition costs").
152. See James T. O'Reilly, Entrepreneurs and Regulators: Internet Technology, Agency
Estoppel, and the Balance of Trust, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 73 (2000) (noting the decrease
in significance of the notice-and-comments process due to increased complexity and unmanageable
paper flow).
153. See Zoltan J. Acs & David S. Evans, Entrepreneurship and Small Business Growth: A Case
Study, in 6 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND EcoNOMIC GROWTH
143, 169 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 1993).
154. See RONALD A. CASS, REVOLUTION IN THE WASTELAND: VALUE AND DIVERSITY IN
TELEVISION 139 (1981) (concluding that new entrants into the programming market are the first to be
free from regulatory control).
155. See supra Part IV.A.2
156. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3, 4 (1971) (arguing through the regulatory process industry special interests will pressure regulators to
the detriment of consumers).
157. Id. at 7; see also Sam Peltzman, Toward A More General Theory ofRegulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211, 212 (1976) (refining Stigler's theory by adding that from the demand side, industry leaders
will lobby most effectively to sway regulation in their favor).
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pointed out inevitable attempts by interest groups to affect government
decision-making processes.58 In doing so, regulated entities may try
various tactics (other than direct monetary bribes). They may promise
future employment to the agency's staff. Recurrent exchanges with the
agency's officials may yield cultivation of personal relationships.
Committing to refrain from publicly criticizing the regulator is another way
to yield the agency's favoritism. Applying indirect pressure through elected
officials may also be a way to influence the regulated agency. Lastly,
lobbying and rallying "grassroots" stakeholders affected by potential
regulation (such as employees and local communities) is another manner
by which regulated parties affect the decision-making process.159
While regulatory capture is not a new phenomenon,16 0 it is worthwhile
reviewing it in light of economies of experience. Stigler epitomized the
political relationship between industry group and regulatory agencies,
noting:
The industry which seeks regulation must be prepared to pay with
the two things a party needs: votes and resources. The resources
may be provided by campaign contributions, contributed services
(the businessman heads a fund-raising committee), and more
indirect methods such as the employment of party workers. The
votes in support of the measure are rallied, and the votes in
opposition are dispersed, by expensive programs to educate (or
uneducate) members of the industry and of other concerned
industries.
These costs of legislation probably increase with the size of the
industry seeking the legislation. Larger industries seek programs
which cost the society more and arouse more opposition from
158. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A
Theory ofRegulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. OF ECON. 1089, 1091 (1991) (arguing that an interest group has
more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation).
159. See DANIEL C. HARDY, REGULATORY CAPTURE IN BANKING 5 (2006) (noting that
"regulatory capture" may result in tight, costly prudential requirements to reduce negative spillovers of
risk-taking by weaker banks).
160. There is an extensive literature on lobbying for regulation. See, e.g., Abagail McWilliams,
David D. Van Fleet & Kenneth D. Cory, Raising Rivals' Costs Through Political Strategy: An
Extension ofResource-Based Theory, 39 J. MGMT. STUD. 707, 710 (2002) (providing various examples
of regulation that increases rivals' costs); Brian Shaffer, Firm-Level Responses to Government
Regulation: Theoretical and Research Approaches, 21 J. MGMT. 495, 500 (1995) (conducting a general
survey of the interaction between firms and governments when it comes to regulation). See generally
Timothy J. Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs", 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 95, 100 (1988)
(further describing the paradigm that allows firms to use regulation against their competitors); Thomas
G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve
Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986) (coining the phrase "raising rivals' costs" in antitrust
literature).
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substantially affected groups. The tasks of persuasion, both within
and without the industry, also increase with its size.16 1
While Stigler focused on the power of larger firms, this Article adds to
the equation the influence of entities possessing experience through age
and scope. Regardless of their size, old-timers that have frequent
interactions with regulatory agencies benefit significantly. Their market
familiarity affords them opportunities to promote regulation that can place
heavier burdens on competitors as a strategy to attain market dominance.16 2
Even if this type of maneuvering is unsuccessful, they may inflict
substantial costs on newcomers by delaying their entry into the market. In
the case of disruptive technologies, when financial stakes are high, delays
of even a few months can substantially impact the ability of newcomers to
compete.
The story of Preston Tucker, an American automobile designer and
entrepreneur, is an apt example.163 Tucker dreamed of making the world's
best car. He teamed up with Abe Karatz, a capitalist, to produce the Tucker
'48, also known as the Tucker Torpedo.1" Tucker's innovative business
model included an Accessories Program, which raised funds by selling
accessories before the car was even in production.16 5 Potential buyers who
purchased Tucker accessories were guaranteed a spot on the dealer waiting
list for a Tucker '48 car.166 Yet, a year later, the government shut down
production of the Tucker '48 amidst allegations of stock fraud made by
other American car manufacturers at that time.16 7 In an open letter to the
automobile industry, Tucker accused its members of fraud and regulatory
pressure:
161. Stigler, supra note 156, at 12.
162. See generally Kelly, supra note 49, at 1645 (describing "strategic spillover" as when parties
employ externalities opportunistically as a type of extortion); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687 (2009) ("Complex regulatory
systems-particularly those requiring government approval for market entry-can create opportunities
for such gaming by enabling dominant parties to dictate industry standards while delaying entry of
competing products.").
163. See STEVE LEHTO, PRESTON TUCKER AND HIS BATTLE TO BUILD THE CAR OF TOMORROW
2 (Chicago Review Press ed., 1st ed. 2016).
164. Larry E. Ribstein, How Movies Created the Financial Crisis, 2009 MICH. ST. L. Rev. 1171,
1185 (2009) ("Tucker's competitors and their allies in government combined to bring him down, but
only after he had been vindicated in principle."); TUCKER: THE MAN AND HIS DREAM (Lucas Film Ltd.
1988).
165. Lehto, supra note 163, at 102.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 116-17.
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There is . .. a very powerful group-which for two years has
carried on a carefully organized campaign to prevent the motoring
public from ever getting their hands on the wheel of a Tucker!
These people have tried to introduce spies into our plant. They
have endeavored to bribe and corrupt loyal Tucker employees.
Such curiosity about what goes on in the Tucker plant should be
highly flattering, I suppose. But they haven't stopped there.
They even have their spokesmen in high places in Washington.
As a direct result of their influence, Tucker dealers all over the
country-men of character and standing in their communities-
have been harassed and grilled by agents of the government and
Congressional Investigating Committees.168
In 1948, Tucker sought to manufacture a vehicle of the future.1 69 His was
an innovative product that was never mass-produced as a result of a
regulatory manipulation. He did not have the financial resources to
effectively combat the auto companies' legal tactics. In this David and
Goliath story, old-timers won by using regulatory influence and litigation
to stifle new market entrants. The Securities and Exchange Commission
investigated his innovative marketing techniques and tried him for fraud.170
He was acquitted in 1950, the year he sought bankruptcy.17 1 He passed
away shortly after his financial debacle while still working on new car
designs.172
The case of City of Columbia goes further to illustrate the ability of
local old-timers, not only to apply, but also to create rules that stifle
regional competition.7 3 In this case, Omni Outdoor Advertising (Omni), a
young Georgia corporation, sought to begin erecting billboards in the
metropolitan area of Columbia, South Carolina.17 4 Columbia Outdoor
Advertising (Columbia Outdoor) was a local company that had been in the
billboard business for forty years, controlled over 95% of the relevant
market, and acted to block Omni from entering its market.17 1
168. Preston Tucker, An Open Letter to the Automobile Industry, Interests of the American
Motorist, WASH. POST, June 13, 1948, at M23.
169. See Abigail Tucker, The Tucker Was the 1940s Car of the Future, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Dec. 2012) http://www.smithsonianrag.com/history/the-tucker-was-the-1940s-car-of-the-future-
135008742/.
170. Lehto, supra note 163, at 109.
171. Id at 124.
172. Id. at 191.
173. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 384 (1991).
174. Id. at 367.
175. Id.
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Columbia Outdoor was owned by a family with close relations to the
city's political leaders.'76 The family met with city officials, seeking the
enactment of zoning ordinances that would restrict billboard
construction.177 The company's efforts prevailed when the Columbia city
council imposed a moratorium period on billboard construction in the city,
except as specifically authorized by the council.17 8 After this ordinance was
invalidated by a state court, the city council passed a new ordinance that
restricted the size, location, and spacing of billboards.'79 Omni sued the city
and Columbia Outdoor for violation of the Sherman Act and for engaging
in unfair trade practices.80 Omni argued that there was an anticompetitive
conspiracy between city officials and Columbia Outdoor.'8 '
The District Court ruled that the alleged activities were outside the
scope of federal antitrust laws.182 The Court of Appeals reversed,
reinstating the verdict in favor of Omni, and the case went before the
Supreme Court.18 3 The Supreme Court ruled that the city's actions, which
were an implementation of state policy, were immune from federal antitrust
liability.1 84 The Court's reasoning for this holding is of much importance.
The Court explained that it is both inevitable and desirable that public
officials consider private citizens' pleas.85 It interpreted the antitrust laws
to condemn trade restraints, not political activity. This case appears to
provide old-timers a pass to utilize political connections to seek legislation
that may result in anticompetitive action.
Lastly, the case of Radiant Burners illustrates the ability of old-timers
to utilize their market connections to bar the entrance of innovative
products.'8 7 The American Gas Association (AGA) operated testing
laboratories to determine the safety, utility, and durability of gas burners.'88
It adopted a "seal of approval" that it affixed on gas burners found to have
passed its tests.189 Nevertheless, its tests were not based on "objective
176. Id
177. Id. at 369.
178. Id. at 368.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 369.
181. Id.
182. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 566 F. Supp. 1444, 1446 (D.S.C. 1983).
183. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 891 F.2d 1127, 1145 (4th Cir. 1989),
rev'd499 U.S. 365 (1991).
184. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 374.
185. Id
186. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 794 (West Publishing 4th ed. 2015).
187. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961).




standards," but were influenced by other market players, such as utility
companies that also sold gas burners.190
Radiant Burners (Radiant) developed new ceramic gas burners that
were safer, durable, and more efficient.191 Yet, the AGA repeatedly refused
to give Radiant's product seal of approval.192 Moreover, the AGA and its
utility members (such as Peoples Gas and Northern Gas who also sold
burners) refused to provide gas service to Radiant's products.193 By doing
so, they effectively excluded Radiant's new product from the market.19 4
Potential customers abstained from installing a product for which they
could not obtain gas service.
The District Court dismissed Radiant's complaint, and the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence of a boycott
or conspiracy.19 5 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was, in
fact, a trade restraint and a public harm.196 It took an elongated regulatory
process and legal persistence for Radiant, a newcomer, to enter the market
of gas burners. Today, ceramic gas burners are a standard. This case
demonstrates the power old-timers have to conspire and prevent
newcomers from selling their products. It shows that by bundling their
products (gas burners and gas service), old-timers possessing economies of
experience gain an advantage of scope and can block service to
newcomers' products.
4. Regulatory Spillovers
Regulation is often a result of bargaining and compromise between
regulators and old-timers. These compromises may increase the regulatory
costs on newcomers. This may be an unintended result of devising rules
that rely on old-timers' production and business models.'97 It may also be
the result of strategic attempts by old-timers to create high entry barriers.
Either way, newcomers oftentimes have to serve as regulatory






195. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 273 F.2d 196, 201 (7th Cir. 1959),
rev'd 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
196. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 667-68 (1961).
197. See infra notes 200-207 and accompanying text.
198. See also Roberta A. Kaplan, Regulation and the Sharing Economy, N.Y. L.J. (July 18,
2014), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/2561266/21julyl4_nylj.pdf (discussing challenges in
regulating a sharing economy). See generally Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory
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based on changing the regulatory environment.1 99 At some point, they may
know more about the regulatory environment than old-timers. But they still
may need to join others or act independently to push for regulatory change
in order to overcome entrenched rules created under older models. This
may create positive spillovers for other market players and society as a
whole.
The recent Aereo litigation saga verified once more the advantages of
economies of experience in thwarting ingress of regulatory change of
disruptive technology by innovative newcomers.2 00 The Aereo litigation
involved the Copyright Act, which extensively regulates TV broadcasting
services.201 Using new technology, Aereo created an innovative
broadcasting platform that picked up free, over-the-air broadcast signals
using antennae.2 02 It then retransmitted the underlying content on the
internet to its subscribers. Its product did not look like standard cable TV
services.20 3 It used thousands of dime-sized antennae, each assigned to an
individual subscriber, that received near-live show streaming.
204
Nevertheless, established TV broadcasters, such as Fox, CBS, NBC, and
Disney, were outraged and sought to place controls on this new platform.
Shortly after Aereo launched, these broadcasters filed for an injunction,
arguing that because Aereo acted like a cable company it needed to pay
Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 (2017) (describing regulatory entrepreneurs as
individuals and firms that pursue a business strategy in which changing the law is a significant part of
the business plan). The hotel and taxi industries are good examples of industries that were shaken by the
recent emergence of the sharing economy that required regulatory change. Newcomers like Airbnb,
which enable people to turn their homes into small hotels, and Uber or Lyft, which enable people to use
their cars as taxi services, have managed to benefit from the regulatory vacuum. See generally Henry
Ross, Ridesharing's House of Cards: O'Connor v. Uber Technologies Inc. and the Viability of Uber's
Labor Model in Washington, 90 WASH. L. REv. 1431, 1431 (2015) (describing the "immense
popularity" of Uber "as the most successful Silicon Valley startup ever," which "after just six years
[had] a network of over 160,000 drivers in the United States alone).
199. See generally DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS, AND
WEALTH FROM THE COMPASS TO THE INTERNET 5 (2003) (using storytelling to describe how
historically noted entrepreneurs carved new markets from the emerging technology and proclaimed that
the old rules no longer applied, thereafter turned to the government and lobbied for order and setting the
stage for the next wave of discovery.).
200. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014); see also Andrew Tutt,
Essay, Textualism and the Equity of the Copyright Act: Reflections Inspired by American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 89 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (2014) (discussing the implications of the
Aereo litigation).
201. For the history of regulatory debates over copyright issues of video programming, see
Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 278, 311-24 (2004) (outlining
FCC and industry debates in the context of broadcasting and cable television).
202. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
203. Aereo's legal rationale relied on a Second Circuit decision, Cablevision, where Cablevision
offered its subscribers what it described as "remote DVR," accessible through Internet connection.
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008).
204. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
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them retransmission fees.205 Aereo refused to pay these fees, arguing that it
did not provide cable or satellite services.206 Aereo's argument prevailed in
both the district and appellate courts.207
For a moment, it seemed like an original technology was able to disrupt
the old regulatory landscape, a spillover effect that might have advantaged
other players in the market. Regulated broadcasters could have benefitted
by empowering consumers to manage their programming according to their
choice. Small and independent broadcasters would have advanced from
expanding viewership in their respective markets. Customers would have
profited from low-rate access to television content through A la carte
channels and mobile viewing.208
Yet, American broadcasting companies appealed the case to the
Supreme Court.209 In a striking 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court decided
that despite using differing technology, Aereo effectively functioned as a
cable TV provider.2 10 The Court held that Aereo's actions infringed upon
the content of network television providers under the Copyright Act.211 In
light of this determination, Aereo applied for a compulsory cable license.
Ironically, it was denied because it was considered an internet provider
outside of the regulatory purview of the cable provider regulation.2 12
Following this litigation, the company declared bankruptcy.2 13 Although
205. Complaint at 4, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(No. 12 Civ. 1540).
206. See Michael Phillips, A Startup, The Supreme Court, and the Future of TV, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/a-startup-the-supreme-court-and-the-future-
of-tv.
207. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5316, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11,
2013); ajfd by WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 705 (2d. Cir. 2013); application denied by Am.
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144851, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2013); WNET v.
Aereo, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
208. Brief for the Consumer Fed'n of Am. and Consumers Union as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 9-10, WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (No. 13-461) (2d Cir. 2013).
209. See Adam Liptak & Emily Steel, Aereo Loses at Supreme Court, in Victory for TV
Broadcasters, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/business/media/supreme-
court-rules-against-aereo-in-broadcasters-challenge.html.
210. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2502-03 (2014).
211. Id; The Supreme Court 2013 Term, Copyright Act of 1976-Transmit Clause-ABC, Inc. v.
Aereo, Inc., 128 HARv. L. REv. 371 (2014) ("[Aereo] violated the Transmit Clause, even though each
user had a dedicated antenna that produced a 'personal' copy of the broadcast.").
212. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012); Letter from Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, Gen. Counsel &
Assoc. Register of Copyrights, to Matthew Calabro, Aereo, Inc. (July 16, 2014).
213. Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/business/aereo-files-for-bankruptcy.html. A similar result happened in
the case of iCraveTV in Canada. Tivo, who bought Aereo's patent, is in pending litigation.
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too late for Aereo, the FCC recently proposed a new rule that legalizes
online video providers like Aereo.214
While some saw Aereo as a copyright evader,215 others commended it
as a regulatory entrepreneur.216 Aereo did not fit into existing regulatory
framework designed to accommodate standing technologies. This case
illustrates regulatory inconsistency, which can disadvantage even
experienced firms. Additionally, the influence and power of the
broadcasting companies contributed to the exclusion of innovative
newcomers like Aereo. There is no doubt that, as a newcomer, Aereo did
not benefit from the same experience and ability to affect its regulatory
environment as the cable and broadcast industry did. In her article The Law
of the Platform, Professor Orly Lobel epitomized newcomers' regulatory
dilemma while discussing the case of Aereo:
Aereo was put in a no-win situation. The Supreme Court told
Aereo it needed a license as a cable provider in order to help
transmit content to end users, yet Aereo was unable to obtain a
compulsory license because it was an Internet provider not
regulated by the FCC. Thus, Aereo is a striking example of a
disruptive platform business facing protective regulations, outdated
legal definitions, and strong industry foes.217
Aereo's battle might have failed but other regulatory entrepreneurs such as
Airbnb and Uber won the regulatory battle. These companies engaged in
entrepreneurship in the first place aiming to change the law.218 Some
operated in gray areas while others simply broke the law and relied on
popular support to leverage their way to shape the law.219
To summarize, the distributional effects of regulatory costs differ
greatly among regulated entities. Conceivably, newcomers lacking
214. See Promoting Innovation and Competition in the Provision of Multichannel Video
Programming Distribution Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 2078-01, 2080 (proposed Jan. 15, 2015) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76).
215. WNET v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting);
Mark Rogowsky, Myth-Busting the Aereo Decision: No, The Supreme Court Didn't Kill It... Nor Did
They Kill Dropbox, FORBES (Jun 26, 2014), www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2014/0
6/2 6/myth-
busting-the-aereo-decision-no-the-supreme-court-didn't-kill-it-nor-did-they-kill-dopbox/ (claiming
Aereo can choose between several options to continue its services).
216. Matthew Schruers, Symposium: Aereo Copyright Decision Creates Uncertainty for the
Cloud, SCOTUsBLOG, (June 26, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-aereo-
copyright-decision-creates-uncertainty-for-the-cloud/ ("While other uncertainty-inducing constructions
are also possible, this would be the interpretation of Aereo that does the least violence to innovation.").
See Pollman & Barry, supra note 198 and accompanying text.
217. Orly Lobel, The Law ofthe Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 140 (2016).




regulatory experience may be disproportionally affected in a regressive
manner. Having no prior experience with regulation and a limited ability to
mitigate the costs of obtaining such knowledge, new, apprenticing, or
"green" entities face larger regulatory hurdles, impeding their development.
Consequently, although a regulation may be efficient in correcting a certain
market failure, its distributional effects may create another. The
government de facto creates bigger obstacles and controls for newcomers.
At times, as the case above demonstrates, the government may even
discourage innovations and the breakthrough of new products into the
market.
B. Unregulated Parties
Costs are not solely borne by a regulated entity; they can affect other
constituents.2 2 0 The ability to mitigate regulatory transaction costs has
significant implications. "Incidence theory" identifies which citizens are
impacted by systemic shifts due to new costs.2 21 It seeks to determine
whom and to what extent a person pays for costs.2 22 For example, firm
managers can sometimes pass regulatory transaction costs backward on to
stakeholders, vendors, and employees, or they can pass the costs forward
223onto customers.22 Although cost allocation is part of the private dealings
between parties, the government may play a key role in determining
aggregate distribution.
Despite many efforts devoted to studying the costs and benefits of
various rules, we know surprisingly little about the incidence of particular
regulations. There are several conceptual issues that inhibit attempts to
establish incidence effects. Naturally, it is challenging to measure the effect
of an entire regulatory system, due to its voluminous and convoluted rules.
Measuring one regulation effectively assumes that all other relative
outputs, performances, and procedures would remain unchanged if the
220. See Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, 20 TAX
POL'Y & ECON. 1, 26 (2006) (discussing the incidence of corporate taxation); William A. Klein, The
Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View of a Problem in Economics, 1965 Wis. L.
REV. 576, 580-87 (1965) (same).
221. See Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the Theory of General and Individual
Taxation, 21 VA. TAx REV. 293, 302 (2002).
222. See MARIAN KRZYZANLK & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE
CORPORATION INCOME TAX 8-9 (1963) (outlining the differences between shifting and incidence
theories in corporate tax theory).
223. See sources cited supra note 110; see also Ian W.H. Parry et al., The Incidence ofPollution
Control Policies, in THE INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS
2006/2007, 19 (Tom Tietenberg & Henk Folmer eds., 2006) (arguing that low-income households bear
a disproportionate share of the costs of environmental regulation).
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government were to eliminate that rule.224 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to
consider the potential incidence of regulation on a cohort of regulated and
unregulated affiliates, even if measuring it is cumbersome.
Labor may endure regulatory costs in the form of lower wages and
225
poorer working conditions. Shareholders may weather a similar effect
via scarce dividends and lower returns on investment.2 26 Consumers could
- 227
bear regulatory costs in the form of higher prices and inferior service.
Vendors might receive lower demands or poorer payment schedules.
228
Lastly, regulatory transaction costs may be transferred to society as a whole
when businesses forgo actions that cultivate social responsibility.22 9
Assume an entity is facing a new regulation: can it pass on its cost to
other markets or players? Contingent upon supply and demand elasticities,
entities may be able to mitigate a portion of their regulatory costs by
transferring some or all of these costs to consumers. Consider the Entities C
and D from the example above.23 0 Both entities developed a new product,
X. Entity C has already produced related product Z. If the government
issues a new regulation affecting both entities, Entity C may be in a better
position to aggregate regulatory costs and pass them on to its captive
customers of both of its products. This is compared to Entity D, who may
only pass the costs onto a single product. Entity D depends heavily on the
224. See, e.g., Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of
the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1640 (criticizing incidence
studies as relying on opposite and unrealistic assumptions).
225. For the incidence of corporate tax on labor see, e.g., Arnold C. Harberger, Monetary and
Fiscal Policy for Equitable Economic Growth, in INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND HIGH-QUALITY GROWTH
203 (Vito Tanzi & Ke-young Chu, eds., 1998) (advocating the view that some or all of the burden is
borne by capital and labor.); see also Roger H. Gordon & Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason, Why Is There
Corporate Taxation in a Small Open Economy? The Role of Transfer Pricing and Income Shifting 3
(NBER, Working Paper No. 4690, 1994), http://www.nber.org.libdata.lib.ua.edu/papers/w
4 69 0.pdf (the
incidence of tax in a small open economy falls on labor); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding
of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 918 (2005) (finding that the real incidence of payroll tax is on the
employee).
226. See Harberger, supra note 110, at 238. (discussing the incidence of corporate tax).
227. Bird & Zolt, supra note 224, at 1641 ("The conventional wisdom was originally that
corporate taxes were borne by some combination of owners of corporate capital, employees, and
consumers of products and services produced by the corporate sector.").
228. See, e.g., Kul B. Bhatia, Intermediate Goods and the Incidence of the Corporation Income
Tax, 16 J. PuB. ECON. 93, 109 (1981) (noting some intermediate suppliers may bear the corporate
income tax through lower prices); Adam H. Rosenzweig, A Corporate Tax for the Next One Hundred
Years: A Proposal for a Dynamic, Self-Adjusting Corporate Tax Rate, 108 NW. U.L. REV. 1029, 1035
(2014) ("[The incidence of corporate tax] simply means that the corporation transfers wealth to the
government instead of to one of its constituencies-shareholders, employees, suppliers, or
consumers.").
229. See generally D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political
Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 648 (1985)
(utilizing an empirical determination of the actual incidence of a national regulation, including society).
230. See supra Part IH.B.
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sale of its single product, X, and thus has a higher price sensitivity and a
lower ability to pass costs onward. In markets with labor-supply elasticity,
entities with fewer products may have less ability to negotiate prices of
labor and goods, so that they may charge the same values for their products
as successful veteran firms do.231
Although there are ordinary costs of doing business, government
regulations may impose costs with devastating distributional effects.
Certain entities might be able to pass these costs forward to customers and
backward to employees, shareholders or suppliers. Other entities that may
not easily mitigate these regulatory outlays are thus forced to sell at
suboptimal prices, leading either to growth or death in the long run.232
These entities may be innovative newcomers generating imperative
spillovers. They are discouraged solely by the government action creating
deadweight loss on regulated newcomers and their unregulated affiliates.
Entities that lack economies of experience may face higher obstacles in
mitigating regulatory costs. Granted, some will be able to overcome these
barriers because of their unique values, but others may lack the opportunity
to do so.233 Entities that are veterans in a market may well sustain super-
competitive prices for longer, effectively deterring new market entrants and
establishing long-term dominance.234 The next Part proposes ways to
remedy the potential for distributional asymmetries of regulatory costs.
Thereafter, it reflects on future research on the efficiency of government
regulation.
V. MITIGATING REGULATORY DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
Government regulation may be explicit or implicit.2 35 It can be imposed
before or contemporaneously with the harmful activity it seeks to
231. Except in cases of diseconomies of experience, veteran airline companies that are saddled
with oppressive labor contracts as opposed to low cost airline companies. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Bailey
& John C. Panzar, The Contestability of Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 129 (1981); see also supra notes 76, 103-108 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 254
(1985) (defining "competition" within antitrust law to refer "not to a state of affairs in which prices are
driven to marginal cost," but a "regime in which small businesses have a chance to compete against
larger, more efficient rivals").
233. See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA.
L. REv. 395, 445 n.230 (2008) ("[I]f the rules will act as a form of protection against import
competition or raise entry barriers in the industry, making it harder for smaller businesses to form and
grow."); see also In re Section 257 Report to Cong. Identifying & Eliminating Mkt. Entry Barriers for
Entrepreneurs & Other Small Businesses, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 15,376, para. 98, 100 (2000).
234. Posner, supra note 74, at 28 (stating that a tort judgment, like a tax, is a payment for a
specific conduct).
235. Id. at 1.
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236prevent.26 Taxes, price controls, and administrative requirements are just a
few examples of ways that regulators administer certain economic
behaviors.237 Many regulations aim to remedy situations where parties act
opportunistically, as well as to solve free riding problems.2 38 Likewise, they
239
purport to force parties to consider the consequences of their actions.
They do this by creating mechanisms for parties to internalize costs, which
are the effects of their behavior on society.240
This Article does not take a normative position on the appropriateness
of regulation.24 1 Previous literature on cost-benefit analysis and other
methodologies have attempted to answer this inquiry.242 Rather, it assumes
that a rule is efficient in fixing a certain market failure.243 Still, once
imposed, that rule's distributional effects disadvantage newcomers. This
may create severe entry barriers that deter parties from engaging in the
activity altogether and result in an overall social loss.2 44 Likewise, this
Article does not consider certain "fairness" issues in regard to old-timers
(who used to once be newcomers themselves) "earning" their right for
236. See Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1725 (2015)
(describing the social costs of ex post regulation); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 778-79 (1996) (noting the ex
post and ex ante characteristics of liability rules).
237. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
499 (1989) (measuring the monetary and nonmonetary costs and benefits of economic regulation).
238. For example, a regulation that solves a tragedy of the commons. See Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (suggesting government regulation as a
potential remedy to the tragedy of the commons).
239. See Kelly, supra note 49, at 1648).
240. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 52-54 (1987) (stating that,
under certain assumptions, strict liability may lead to optimal activity and care levels in the product
market); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1273 (1998) (arguing that any form of regulation that
seeks to internalize costs must measure actual damages).
241. See, e.g., Hahn & Hird, supra note 35, at 261-78 (reviewing studies of the costs and
benefits of regulation).
242. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
243. But see Erin Ann O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of
Contractual Choice ofLaw, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1587 (2000) (finding that franchise contracts
provide a useful example of how contractual choice-of-law can sometimes be used to minimize the
continuing "dead weight" losses associated with regulation); Scott Andrew Shepard, A Negative
Externality by Any Other Name: Using Emissions Caps as Models for Constraining Dead-Weight Costs
of Regulation, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 345, 346 (2014) (suggesting a regulatory "compliance-cost cap"
system derived from emissions-cap models to convince regulatory agencies to constrain the deadweight
costs of their environmental regulations).
244. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 125-26 (1982) (finding that a
government regulation that serves as an entry barrier is a dangerous form of trade restraint); Daniel J.
Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v. Berkeley, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1257, 1295-
1296 (1986) (defining "deadweight social loss" as "the value (including lost consumer surplus) in goods
or services that would have been produced or sold in a competitive market but that are not produced
because of the anticompetitive effects of the law of a state or a political subdivision thereof').
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regulatory advantage. It merely points out to those asymmetrical
distributional effects that might occur due to economies of experience in
regulation and possible solutions to alleviate such burdens should
policymakers seek to do so in order to embolden innovation and market
competition.
A. Deregulating Newcomers
One solution to the problems faced by newcomers may lie in the form
of deregulation. If regulatory action provides a competitive disadvantage to
newcomers, the government may exclude them from its purview. For
instance, at present, the government provides numerous regulatory
exemptions to people who operate or own stocks in small firms. 245 Relief
from registration and reporting requirements under SEC rules,246
exemptions from labor and employment rules,247 and exclusions from
248health and safety guidelines, are just a few examples of current sized-
based deregulation. Moreover, for each regulation, regulating agencies
must prepare an "initial regulatory flexibility analysis," describing the
effect of the proposed rule on small entities.2 49  These regulatory
exemptions have been rooted in the U.S. legal system since the early
twentieth century, when the typical business enterprise was small, local,
and personal. Small-business enterprises, Americans believe, epitomize
245. See generally Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the "Little Guy" Myth in Legal Definitions,
98 IOwA L. REv. 1041 (2013) (outlining small business deregulation in various areas of the law).
246. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78qq (2012), 17 C.F.R
§§ 210, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, 260, 269 (2017) (offering scaled disclosure requirements under
regulation S-K); Small entities under the Securities Act for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
17 C.F.R. § 230.157 (2017).
247. To name a few, the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B) (2012)
(excluding from its ambit employers with fewer than fifty employees); Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (2012) (exempting firms with fewer than 100
employees from notifying their employees in a case of mass layoffs); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (exempting small firms from minimum wage, overtime pay eligibility,
and child labor standards).
248. See, e.g., Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (provides relief
from tax penalties and health insurance costs to small entities). Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012) (excluding firms with less than fourteen employees from
requirements regarding discrimination in employment, public services, and accommodations for people
with special needs or disabilities); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,036 (2010) (allowing special exclusions for small entities from common
standards of privacy).
249. 5 U.S.C. § 603 (2012); see also Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213, 216-26 (1982).
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independence and liberty and a counterpoint to large corporations, thus,
they deserve regulatory favoritism. 250
Nevertheless, exclusions do not solve the problem of regulatory costs.
Exclusions do not eliminate regulatory costs altogether, because they
introduce additional, indirect costs of learning the various secondary
exclusionary rules.2 5 1 The promulgation process of such size-based
exemptions typically does not consider informational and learning costs to
such regulated and unregulated parties.252 Incumbents still must determine
whether regulatory exemptions apply and plan for the best course of action
to stay within their purview.25 3 They must stay informed about new or
revised regulatory exclusions and must monitor and interpret exemption
levels. Unregulated third parties suffer from similar informational costs in
determining whether an entity is considered small under each law, in order
to reduce their risk of non-compliance or production delays.25 4
Lastly, morally speaking, scholars have long argued that in striking a
balance between public health, privacy, and the risk of defrauding the
public, small-business politics have prevailed.25 5 Millions of employees,
customers, and citizens are left unprotected by government regulation due
to the size of the business with which they interact.2 56 Size-based regulatory
exemptions prevent many from suing small firms for unpaid overtime,
250. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, supra note 21, at 14 (describing the historical consequences that
allowed the proliferation of small business deregulation).
251. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small is Not Beautiful. The Case Against Special Regulatory
Treatment of Small Firm, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 542 (1998) (arguing small business exemptions are
inefficient).
252. See Bradford, supra note 39.
253. Small Perspectives on Mandates, Paperwork, and Regulations: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Small Bus., 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1997) (where small businessmen testified on the high
amount that they pay each year to comply with regulatory paperwork requirements); C. Steven
Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case for an Unconditional
Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 3 (2001) ("Many small business issuers and their
advisers are totally unaware that they must comply with federal or state securities law.").
254. Bradford, supra note 39, at 25 ("[E]xemptions sometimes increase the information costs of
unregulated third parties who may need to distinguish between regulated and unregulated firms.
Exemptions also encourage wasteful strategic behavior by firms seeking to avoid regulation.").
255. See generally Jeffrey J. Hass, Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted Over the Internet:
Are they "Suitable" For The Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 87 (1998) (stating that "with the
SEC's adoption of simplified small business registration on Form S-18 in 1979, Regulation A
temporarily became a 'dead letter'); Thomas Lee Hazen, Social Networks and the Securities Laws-
Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1735, 1745-46 (2012) (criticizing the various small business exemptions in securities law).
256. See Kathleen M. Nichols, Labor and Employment Law-Determining Employee Status for
Evolving Business Associations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act-Clackamas
Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003), 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 239, 241
(2004) ("[T]he ADA does not cover over twenty million employees due to the size of the business.").
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minimum wage, or child labor violations.25 7 There is no indication that this
analysis and sentiment will change if deregulation will be based on
economies of experience. Simply put, deregulation undermines the
efficiency of government action and creates double standards.258
B. Regulatory Information Sharing Networks
A straightforward solution to the distributional effects of regulation
could be collaborative. At present, old-timers dominate trade associations
to which regulatory agencies defer in the rulemaking process. Newcomers
may form cooperatives and networks to share regulatory information and
strategies.2 5 9 Data can be compiled based on information gathered by each
newcomer. Thereafter, this data may be collected and delivered to network
members for a participation fee. The network may also hire consultants and
lawyers who will provide advice to its members at a reduced fee.
This is easier said than done. The case of Northwest is an example of
the issues that collaborative networks may face.2 60 Northwest Wholesale
Stationers (Northwest) was a cooperative buying agency of office supply
retailers.2 61 Northwest acted as a wholesaler to its members and provided
warehousing facilities.262 The cooperative membership consisted of
approximately 100 office supply retailers in the Pacific Northwest states
that purchased supplies from the cooperative.263 At the end of the year,
Northwest distributed profits to its members in the form of a percentage
257. See Marc Linder, The Small-Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: The
"Original" Accumulation of Capital and the Inversion of Industrial Policy, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 403, 444
(1998).
258. See, e.g., Ruben H. Arredondo, Diferent Strokes for Diferent Folks: Balancing the
Treatment of Employers and Employees in Employment Discrimination Cases in Courts within the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 261, 285 (2002) (criticizing small employer
exemptions in anti-discrimination legislation).
259. See, e.g., G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47UCLA
L. REV. 887, 895-96 (2000) (describing a "connected contracts" model of collaborative economic
activity); Dariam M. Ibrahim, Financing The Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 726 (2010)
(describing Stanford Research Park as a successful effort to foster academic-industrial cooperation);
Kurt Matzler, Viktoria Veider & Wolfgang Kathan, Adapting to the Sharing Economy, 56 MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 71 (2015) (discussing Uber, Zipcar, and Airbnb as examples of successful startups built on
collaborative consumption systems). Owners forums and networks can be a good example of
regulatory-cost collaboration. See also Jan Schaffer, The Future of Online Journalism: Innovations in
the Delivery of Online Local News, 8 ISJLP 543, 549 (2013) (discussing collaborative news networks).
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rebate.264 Northwest's bylaws prohibited members from engaging in both
retail and wholesale operations.26 5
Twenty years after it joined the cooperative, Pacific Stationery was
expelled without notice by a vote of Northwest cooperative members.26 6
Pacific Stationery became the leading office supplies retailer in the area.267
It also acted as a wholesaler; thus, according to Pacific Stationery, was
voted out by the other members.2 68 Pacific Stationery sued, alleging that its
expulsion constituted a group boycott that limited its ability to compete,
and the expulsion should be considered a violation of the Sherman Act.269
The district court rejected this argument, finding no anticompetitive effect.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit sided with Pacific Stationery.270 Northwest
appealed that decision. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that Pacific was required to prove a group boycott or a concerted refusal to
deal.27 1 The Court further held that when a party challenges expulsion from
a joint buying cooperative, it is required to demonstrate that the cooperative
possessed market power or unique access to a business element necessary
for effective competition.27 2 Regulatory knowledge could, in essence, be
considered an important element of competition. Thus, it is hard to tell
whether the sharing of regulatory information in networks will be able to
withstand a similar legal attack.
Consider media networks like internet discussion forums as another
example of an information-sharing solution. Scholars recently investigated
online interactions in Uber and Lyft drivers' forums on the subject of
taxation.273 While these forums had some inaccurate or confusing
information, they displayed general understanding of legal issues. Forum
participants also frequently discussed whether driving was profitable.274
Participants exhibited a range of awareness of how certain tax rules affect
them.275 Still, internet forums contain uncertainty and an overall lack of
264. Id.




269. Id. at 288.
270. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co. v. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th
Cir. 1983), rev'd472 U.S. 284 (1985).
271. Pacific Stationery, 472 U.S. at 298.
272. Id at 290.
273. See generally Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from
Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 56 (2016).
274. Id at 5.
275. Id
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substantiation.27 6 Accordingly, readers are not able to differentiate
effectively between correct and incorrect advice dispensed in these forums.
There are other problems with information sharing. Some examples are
collective action, free riding, and coordination issues.277 Moreover,
regulatory information may fluctuate for each entity according to its
structure, production progress, and its industry.278 There are various
antitrust concerns regarding industry associations and coordination.2 79 This
might be more acute in cases of industry-specific regulations, and less in
regard to information-sharing networks on "meta regulations" (such as
securities laws and labor and employment laws). For example, accelerators
and incubators provide such general financial and business information to
their incumbent firms. 28 0 Lastly, regulatory information is a competitive
advantage that many newcomers would prefer not to share once
obtained.281
276. Id. at 5-6.
277. See George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 359, 364-65 (1974). For a law and economics
analysis of "network effects," where a group of people use a particular good or service, see generally
Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REv. 1179, 1182 (2003) (arguing that networks
are likely to be efficient regulators in markets characterized by significant network benefits and low
concentration); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications ofNetwork Economic Effects,
86 CALIF. L. REv. 479 (1998) (discussing compensatory institutions including regulatory competition
through which there is choice between alternative regulatory regimes).
278. See supra Part II.
279. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 23, at 286; David B.
Audretsch, William J. Baumol & Andrew E. Burke, Competition Policy in Dynamic Markets, 19 INT'L
J. OF INDUS. ORG. 613 (2001) (developing a dynamic theory of industrial organization of hybrid
network governance); Thomas A. Lambert, Tweaking Antitrust's Business Model, 85 TEX. L. REV. 153,
182-83 (2006) (reviewing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION (2005)) (describing collaborative networks as involving two types of anticompetitive
arrangements: first, network participants may "agree to reduce their own collective output and raise
price"; second, they might "agree to exclude competing firms from the network, either to facilitate a
price increase or else to suppress rival technologies").
280. See, e.g., Brad Bernthal, Investment Accelerators, 21 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 139 (2016)
(explaining the legal and extralegal dimensions of Investment Accelerator systems as information
networks and institutions that support entrepreneurs and early stage startups).
28 1. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of
the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REv. 37, 115 (2006) (discussing the information flaws of the traditional
model of VC investment); James A. Henderson, Jr., Contracts Constitutive Core: Solving Problems by
Making Deals, 2012 U. ILL. L. REv. 89, 112 (2012) (describing takeover processes over small group
collaborations by acquiring startup companies that employed collaborative models and solved product
innovation problems but lack financial resources).
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C. Compensatory Tax Instruments
Taxation and regulation have similar effects.2 82 They are both
manifestations of sovereign power. Taxation is both doctrinal and
metaphorical-a "tax" on behavior. Aside from raising revenue, many tax
provisions are aimed at encouraging or discouraging a behavior by
internalizing its social costs.2 83 This parallelism rests on the notion that
when a regulatory cost affects the value of property, it is appropriating a
portion of it.284
Some courts view taxation as an asset price adjustment in response to
granting a tax benefit.2 8 5 They contend that taxation is reflected in the
surplus sum that buyers will pay for an asset above the price that they
would have paid were no tax benefit associated with owning that asset. On
the other hand, regulation has been viewed as a form of "takings," where
the government affects specific property interests.286 Like taxation,
regulations can potentially impose costs on certain constituents or benefit
others.287
282. See Alexander Wu, U.S. International Taxation in Comparison with Other Regulatory
Regimes, 33 VA. TAX REV. 169, 171 (2013) (finding that taxation and regulation are not perfect
substitutes and that there are different behavioral outcomes and legal justifications, depending on the
context).
283. See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the "Fat Tax ": The Role ofFood Taxes in Developed
Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1322 (2005) (discussing the public health perspective using tax as
self-control device for addicts in the case of tobacco taxation and taxes on certain foods); see also Tax
Expenditures: Compendium ofBackground Material on Individual Provisions: Before the S. Comm. on
the Budget, 112th Cong., 358 (2012) ("For taxpayers who can itemize, the home mortgage interest
deduction encourages home ownership by reducing the cost of owning compared with renting.").
284. See David A. Weisbach, Implications of Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REV. 373, 373 (1999)
(discussing the importance of implicit tax in the context of the pre-tax profit requirement for tax
shelters).
285. See E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (payments
to cover health costs of retired coal miners violated substantive due process).
286. See id at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A]pplication of the Takings Clause here bristles
with conceptual difficulties. If the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to pay B, why
does it not apply when the government simply orders A to pay the government, i.e., when it assesses a
tax?"); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of
Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 729 (2002) (discussing the
Takings Clause's parallel effect to changing marginal tax rates); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., When Does
Retroactivity Cross the Line? Winstar, Eastern Enterprises and Beyond: The Allure of Consequential
Fit, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1261, 1265 (2000) ("All forms of property regulations and confiscations can be
viewed as taxes."); Weisbach, supra note 284, at 374.
287. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 23
(1971) (finding that some of the benefits of measuring the effect of taxation by regulation is the ability
to discuss tax policy concepts such as delegation of authority to agencies, efficiency, equity, and
enforcement in that context). The idea that regulation and taxation are in some respects interchangeable
dates back to the mid-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See, e.g., Needham C. Collier, The Federal
Constitution and the Independence ofthe States-One oflts Cardinal Purposes, 1 LAw 615, 618 (1906)
(discussing the interchangeability of liquor licenses and tax on liquor); Joseph R. Long, Federal Police
Regulation by Taxation, 9 VA. L. REV. 81 (1922) (discussing the constitutionality of taxation by
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Viewing regulation as taxation can be illuminating because it provides
compensatory tools to mitigate the effects of regulation.2 88 This analogy
opens the door to new policies and solutions without compromising
regulatory sovereignty. Altering the progressivity of the corporate income
tax is one way of mitigating the effect of implicit taxation through
regulation.2 8 9 Another solution may be to permit the deductibility of
regulatory costs only to entities that lack economies of experience. Lastly,
if the government's regulatory actions evidently disadvantage
newcomers,2 90 then providing a compensatory tax credit might be useful.
Regulators can construct a Newcomers' Tax Credit that gradually decreases
with experience and phases out to counter the regressive effect of
regulation.291
From both political and policy perspectives, the first two options seem
less feasible. Not all newcomers are subject to the corporate income tax
regime, so changes in its progressivity would not affect them.292 Those that
are subject to the regime may present income levels that fluctuate
regulation). Professor Charlotte Crane advanced the view that taxes do, or should, affect prices.
Charlotte Crane, Some Explicit Thinking About Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REV. 339, 354 (1999) ("The
tax benefit [is] . . . reflected in a higher price the bond buyer pays so that the total after-tax yield is the
same as for a cash flow receiving no special tax treatment.").
288. See, e.g., James M. Poterba, Tax Reform and the Market for Tax-Exempt Debt, 19
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 537 (1989) (using empirical data to test the relationship between implicit
tax rate and tax policy changes).
289. On the link between the general concept of progressivity and economic activity, see Robert
P. Inman, Comments to Gilbert E. Metcalf The Lifetime Incidence ofState and Local Taxes: Measuring
Changes During the 1980s, in TAx PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 89, 89 (Joel Slemrod ed.,
1994) (explaining how graduated tax schedules help societies efficiently allocate resources); Michael L.
Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and Compliance, 16 LAW & POL'Y 27, 27-
30, 34 (1994) (discussing fairness and graduated measures in tax systems). But see James M. Snyder &
Gerald H. Kramer, Fairness, Self-Interest, and the Politics of the Progressive Income Tax, 36 J. PUB.
ECON. 197, 197 (1988) (contending that "marginal-rate progression is not the result of society's desire
to achieve a more 'fair' distribution of income" but is instead the result of middle-income taxpayers
"wanting to reduce their own burden").
290. Booz-ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS ON SMALL BUSINESSES 34 (1982) (finding that EPA regulations increase industry
concentration and reduce new entrants); see also Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited:
The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 229
(arguing that an environmental-specific permit model would place undesirably disproportionate entry
barriers).
291. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 129 (2011)
(showing that in the international tax context, unlike implicit taxes, some explicit taxes are creditable
under the current foreign tax credit system).
292. Today, the main entity choices are a general or limited partnership, a Limited Liability
Company, a Subchapter C Corporation, a Limited Partnership, a General Partnership, or a Subchapter S
Corporation. While these are the main forms, there are other entity classifications, .such as the LLP and
LLLP. See Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1392 (2006)
(discussing entity choice considerations).
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greatly.2 93 Furthermore, focusing on newcomers' income misses the point.
Income is not necessarily correlated with age and scope.294 Lastly, limiting
the ability to deduct regulatory costs negates a deeply rooted policy of
accounting for the cost of producing income.29 5 It would likely exacerbate
the moral hazard of obtaining such a deduction.
A tax credit functions as a dollar-per-dollar reduction in tax liability.
296
Many newcomers do not have positive income in their nascent years.
Where there is no positive income, there is no tax liability. Thus, the
newcomers' tax credit could gradually phase out as experience increases. It
could also be made refundable, providing a cash payment even to those
newcomers with zero or negative tax liability. These features will help
maintain the effectiveness of the new credit, regardless of the presence of
net income.297 By multiplying a composite indicator of experience (the
entity's scope and age) by a fixed industry-based credit amount, the
regressive nature of a regulation may be offset.298 Naturally, a newcomer's
tax credit involves a substantial revenue loss and may lead to new
administrative costs or strategic planning. To remain revenue-neutral,
introducing the credit alone would be ineffective unless combined with
299
revenues from eliminating current size-based deregulation.
Although these compensatory proposals may be instrumental in
narrowing the distributional effects of regulations on certain incumbents by
"leveling the playing field," they may not entirely solve the problem.
Scholars have long debated the use of the tax system and the choice
293. See Diego B. Avanzini, Designing Composite Entrepreneurship Indicators: An Application
Using Consensus PCA, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 37, 39-40 (Wim Naudd
ed., 2011) (discussing several measures of entrepreneurship).
294. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Legal Mirror of Entrepreneurship, 55 B.C. L. REV. 719, 729 (2014)
(debunking the association of size of income or entity to entrepreneurship).
295. See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012); Forgeus v. Comm'r, 6 B.T.A. 291 (1927) (attorney's charge for
preparing income tax return was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense where
taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business); Malcolm L. Morris, Determining Deductions Deserves
Deductibility, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 75, 86-87 (1993) (noting that certain tax compliance costs are
deductible under section 162 or section 212).
296. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate,
92 TEX. L. REv. 303, 377 (2013) (describing the difficulties of measuring income and costs of cash-
trapped startups).
297. In the past, there have been proposals to grant newcomers partial refundable credits by
allowing them to claim the credit against their employment taxes. See, e.g., Startup Innovation Credit
Act of 2013, S. 193, 113th Cong. (2013); Startup Innovation Credit Act of 2012, S. 3460, 112th Cong.
(2012).
298. For a clarification of the use of the term "regressive" in this article, see supra note 27. See
SAISANA & TARANTOLA, supra note 17, at 5 (2002) (defining a Composite Indicator as a mathematical
combination of indicators and finding it to be a better way to represent different dimensions of a
concept as the subject of examination).
299. See supra Part V.A.
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between indirect tax credits and direct federal spending programs.300
Taxation creates deadweight loss by increasing prices for consumers and
lowering output.0o It introduces new informational and strategic costs. It
may be optimal where the government has a comparative advantage in
obtaining and evaluating information.30 2 Hence, although a new credit may
be a viable solution, it remains to be seen whether its overall net effect on
newcomers will be beneficial.
D. Regulatory Sandboxes
Currently, there are various measures that aim to protect parties
affected by agency action. For example, agencies often publish advance
notice of a proposed rule to announce a new rule and request public input.
At this point, the agency publishes the proposed rule along with the
justification behind it and a response to any public comment on the
advance notice. Thereafter, the Administrative Procedure Act imposes
303procedures, such as public notice and the opportunity for comment. The
purpose of these measures is to improve fairness, encourage public
participation, and increase consensus in the rulemaking process.304
This type of "regulatory negotiation" (reg neg) includes a broad range
of methods used by agencies for soliciting public input. Methods can
include public hearings, one-time workshops, occasional roundtables, and
established advisory committees.305 Throughout the advance notice and the
notice-and-comment periods, interested parties can create coalitions and
bargain over rulemaking with the regulating agency. This may result in
customized rules favoring old-timers that possess market influence and
prior experience in this type of bargaining. How can newcomers achieve
greater impact throughout the development of proposed rules?
300. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 296, at 333; Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 84, at 959
(finding that the decision whether to implement a "nontax" program or a "tax" program is a matter of
institutional design and may be lacking if there are no benefits to coordinating the functions at issue
with tax administration, or if they are lower than the additional costs from requiring administrators to
specialize in these relatively distinct functions); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political
Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 174, 177, 255-57 (2009) (arguing that
enactment of temporary-effect rather than permanent legislation would promote more political
accountability and may result in greater fiscal restraint).
301. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 84, at 959.
302. Id. at 960.
303. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
304. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1727, 1728 (2007) (criticizing Treasury's position regarding the interpretative nature of most of its
regulations, thus exempting them from the public notice and comment requirements).
305. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DuKE L.J. 1255, 1256 (1997).
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One way to achieve such impact is for newcomers to assume a more
predominant role in the rulemaking process through "regulatory
sandboxes." This process was recently proposed by the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) in the UK. According to the FCA, industry players come
together to propose, discuss, and test innovations in the area of Fintech
(denoting software technologies aimed at supporting banking financial
services) without suffering the consequences of regulatory default.
306 In the
Fintech industry, there are particular concerns about risk to financial
markets, jurisdictional competition to be the next Silicon Valley for
financial technologies, etc.30 7 These regulatory sandboxes are currently
being considered by other regulators such as the Australian Securities and
Investment Commissions, Singapore's Monetary Authority, and Abu
Dhabi's Financial Services Regulatory Authority.3
08
The idea of regulatory sandboxes originated from the acknowledgment
of regulatory voids and uncertainties in the area of disruptive technological
innovation. In this area, knowing how to structure regulatory interventions
is difficult. Preserving the regulatory status quo, however, is much worse,
as it may hamper new technologies from reaching the market.
3 09 Through
participation in sandboxes, the FCA is looking to reduce some of the
existing regulatory barriers to firms that are testing innovative ideas. The
function of the sandbox is to allow the FCA to maintain suitable regulatory
310
safeguards while listening to the concerns of entrepreneurs.
Regulatory sandboxes could be implemented in the rulemaking process
of some industries in the U.S. focused on including newcomers. Regulated
agency officials can conduct open hearings or invite newcomers to
participate in rulemaking committees to examine the feasibility of
regulation in key issues. It may look into the type of regulatory barriers
306. FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, REGULATORY SANDBOX (2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf ("This paper is a report to Her
Majesty's Treasury on the feasibility and practicalities of developing a regulatory sandbox that is a 'safe
space' in which businesses can test innovative products, services, business models and delivery
mechanisms without immediately incurring all the normal regulatory consequences of engaging in the
activity in question.").
307. See, e.g., Chris Brummer & Yesha Yaday, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma (Vand. L.
Research Paper No. 17-46, 2017) (discussing other possible regulatory responses such as informal
guidance, performing pilots, providing licenses); Hilary J. Allen, A US Regulatory Sandbox? (Oct. 20,
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract-3056993 (describing the unique potential of
using regulatory sandboxes in the Fintech industry).
308. Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow: What
Happens When Technology is Faster than the Law?, (Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 2016-8; U. of St. Thomas (Minnesota) Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 16-23; TIIEC Discussion Paper No. 2016-024, 2016), https://ssm.com/abstract=-283
453 1
(discussing the function of regulatory sandboxes in the FinTech industry).
309. Id. at 15.
310. See Allen, supra note 307.
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newcomers face when entering the industry and ways to lower them. It
could discuss the appropriate safeguards to protect public safety and
welfare. Lastly, these types of industry-based sandboxes can deliberate on
ways to maintain creativity and flexibility in rulemaking to assure
regulatory arrangements continue to consider new solutions and remain
current. 3 1
Through sandboxes, regulators could become more proactive, dynamic,
and responsive in their efforts to include entities that lack economies of
experience. Congress might even compel newcomers' inclusion in the
rulemaking process. For example, current government contracting laws
require that 23% of procurement contracts originate from entities lacking
economies of scale.312 Similarly, the government may require regulating
agencies to obtain at least 23% of their input from newcomers in the
industry.
Actively reaching out to recently listed newcomers to participate in the
rulemaking process will create more opportunities for them to become
well-versed and leave their mark. It will allow all parties to a regulatory
directive to exchange ideas in a quicker manner. Reduced delays driven by
regulatory uncertainty will shorten innovative products' time to market.
Improving the access of newcomers in this process will enable
policymakers to receive more diverse considerations and will likely yield
better regulation. It may restore trust and support of the regulatory
authority among more constituents. Nevertheless, just because an agency
invites participation by newcomers does not mean that newcomers will
follow. There remains the challenge of incentivizing newcomers to invest
time and money (that they usually do not have) in participating in the
regulatory process. Moreover, the government will need to place
safeguards to prevent certain old-timers from gaming and using such
regulatory sandboxes to their benefit.1
VI. CONCLUSION
The entry of newcomers into the market has long been a measure of
economic health.314 Young firms are the engine of innovative discoveries
311. Id. at 5.
312. See U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., WHAT IS A SMALL BUSINESS SET ASIDE? (2017)
https://www.sba.gov/contracting/government-contracting-programs/what-smal-business-set-aside.
313. There has been a concern of banks participating and abusing regulatory sandboxes to their
benefit.
314. WILLIAM BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE GROWTH
MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 10 (2002); see also Rajshree Agarwal, David Audretsch & M.B. Sarkar, The
Process of Creative Construction: Knowledge Spillovers, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth, 1
STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 263, 265 (2007) ("[I]nnovations of new entrants generate selection
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and employment growth.315 Since innovation and technological advances
contribute to long-term economic growth more than capital accumulation,
barriers and restraints on innovation very likely produce economic harm.316
In my earlier work, I provided a model that evaluates the potential of
young, innovative entities on economic development.317 This Article points
to an asymmetrical distribution of regulatory costs that falls heavier on
these same entities. It exposes the degree by which newcomers are
disadvantaged when entering a regulated market or dealing with a new rule.
When government plays a prominent role in business, it has the
potential of creating market "winners and losers." 318 Since the government
has rulemaking power, old-timers will compete for its favor and engage in
"rent-seeking."319 They will attempt to secure competitive benefits for
themselves and to prevent newcomers from accessing those benefits. Some
regulatory gaming and manipulation have been declared antitrust
violations.320  Nevertheless, monitoring and prohibiting attempts to
influence regulatory and state action are difficult endeavors.32 1 Case law
such as City of Columbia even permits such activities.322
Greater inclusion of market players in "regulatory sandboxes" prior to
promulgating rules will provide newcomers with a voice in the process of
developing new regulations. Introducing a Newcomers' Tax Credit to
compensate them for participating in rulemaking could mitigate some of
the costs of their inexperience. Forming regulatory information
cooperatives can help share these costs with other newcomers. While these
pressures on existing firms."); Duke Niels et al., A Report on Design, Data, and Quality Control of the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR MANUAL (2012),
http://www.gemconsortium.org/report (demonstrating the contribution of young entities to economic
growth).
315. Haltiwanger, Who Creates Jobs?, supra note 18 (proving it is young entities that contribute
the most to employment growth).
316. Hovenkamp, supra note 11.
317. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 294, at 720 (defining the phenomenon of entrepreneurship).
318. See Robert Crandall, Who Wins the Regulatory Game? 4 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 495-96
(1987) (reviewing ROBERT A. LEONE, WHO PROFITS: WINNERS, LOSERS AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION (1986)) (describing the book as helping private decision makers and public policymakers
cope with the fact that government policies create winners and losers); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1999)
(exemplifying net winners and losers from global environmental regulation).
319. Stigler, supra note 156, at 13.
320. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 49, at 723 (defining "regulatory price squeezes" as involving
"manipulation of the regulatory system for anticompetitive ends" and "behavior that regulators have
specifically endorsed, that falls within their core regulatory ambit, and that requires detailed knowledge
of both firm and industry economics").
321. See Keith A. Rowley, Immunity from Regulatory Price Squeeze Claims: From Keogh,
Parker, and Noerr to Town of Concord and Beyond, 70 TEx. L. REV. 399, 416-18 (1991) (discussing a
number of cases involving regulatory price squeeze allegations).
322. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 375 (1991).
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solutions may not resolve the regressive impact of regulations entirely, they
may be instrumental in narrowing such effect. They have the potential of
improving newcomers' survival and lowering entry barriers. To avoid the
concentration of power, anticompetitive behavior, and monopolized
deadweight losses, it is important for policymakers to recognize and correct
obstacles to entry, especially those created by government actions.323
Designing a regulatory framework that ensures social goals are met while
encouraging disruptive innovations is not an easy task.
This Article also hopes to spur empirical research on the incidence of
regulation on a cohort of regulated and unregulated affiliates to reveal how
far down the distribution chain the potential asymmetries described above
affect. Further experimentation is required with respect to the type of
experience that matters most, the extent of age and scope that is distressed
by the regulatory asymmetry, and the ways to alleviate the effects of the
regulatory action on innovative newcomers. This Article also hopes to
instigate further policy discussions, with the goal of attaining the ends of
regulatory norms. Responsible regulators should routinely consider other,
more efficient methods to mitigate the impact of regulation on society.
323. See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION
EMPIRES (2010) (analyzing Apple, Google, and AT&T, the author questions whether we are on the
verge of having the World Wide Web that encompasses the flow of American information ruled by one
corporate leviathan in possession of "the master switch").
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